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
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
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
SOVIET AND AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: ARMS RACE, MILITARY BALANCE, OR ZONE OF PEACE

Kenneth Wimmel

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Although one may be strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the good will of the natives.

- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1513)

Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear.

- Edmund Burke, Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France (1793)

Oh, wad some power the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!
It was frae monie a blunder free us
An' foolish notion.

- Robert Burns, To A Louse (1779)

Abstract of

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ARMS RACE, MILITARY BALANCE OR, POSSIBLY, A ZONE OF PEACE?

The main points of the history of the American installation on Diego Garcia, especially its complicated legislative history, and of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968, including the base at Berbera, are traced (to early May, 1976). Some of the theories that have been advanced to explain the motives behind the activities of the two superpowers are considered, especially the argument that preparations by the United States during the 1960s to deploy SSBNs in the Indian Ocean prompted the Soviet Union to deploy forces there as a defensive reaction. The almost unanimous opposition by the countries of the littoral to the superpower presence is considered through analysis of the results of canvassing by the Department of State in those countries and certain public statements by their governments. The principal points of the United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace are reviewed. The paper concludes that the arguments on the public record to support the need for the base on Diego Garcia have not been persuasive, that the base has not been the political asset for the United States in the Indian Ocean region its advocates claim it is,

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SOVIET AND AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN:
ARMS RACE, MILITARY BALANCE OR, POSSIBLY, A ZONE OF PEACE?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In an article published in early 1968, an Indian military analyst offered a perceptive and in retrospect even remarkable prediction:

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Indian Ocean is likely to be an area of intense and competitive naval activity of the two superpowers. This will be a very much more significant event than Britannia fading away from the waves of the East.¹

When that was published, the first Soviet naval incursions in any strength into the Indian Ocean had yet to occur, and since American naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia had not yet been funded much less built, American naval resources in the entire Indian Ocean region were limited to the three small ships of the Middle East Force stationed at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf -- hardly a situation of intense and competitive naval activity. But much has happened in the intervening eight years, and in view

of the long-running debate that has developed in the American Congress, in the United Nations and in the press about American and Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, this forecast seems to many people unfortunately to be proving correct. The debate, reduced to its essentials, focuses on a handful of questions: is a naval arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in progress in the Indian Ocean? If so, why? How can it be stopped? A great deal has been written and argued, but fully satisfactory answers to these important and disturbing questions remain as elusive as ever, and the debate, sharply revived in Congress, by an incident in May 1976, at this writing, goes on as does the naval activity that feeds it.

In the United States Congress, the debate has been carried on for more than five years, mainly in a series of committee hearings that have focused on the question whether the United States has need for some sort of permanent naval facilities on the island of Diego Garcia and, if so, what the nature of those facilities should be. Some facilities have already been built and are currently being expanded, but it would be premature to conclude that the issue has been resolved. At this writing, all funds appropriated for expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia have not yet been released in the hope that some sort of agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union about the Indian Ocean.

In the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace free from Great Power military and naval competition was passed in 1971 without a single opposing vote and actively supported by a majority of the countries of the Indian Ocean littoral. The declaration has been reaffirmed in every subsequent General Assembly session, and a committee exists in the U.N. to seek implementation of the resolution. The committee met a number of times in 1975. Its principal objective is to convene an international conference aimed at implementing the peace zone resolution, and it plans to meet again to continue pursuing that objective in 1976.²

No matter what the final disposition of the funds allocated for Diego Garcia or what the nature of the facilities that finally emerge on that island, the issues raised in the long debate over Diego Garcia are unlikely to be resolved or forgotten so long as a naval arms race between the two superpowers, or what is considered by others to be an arms race, continues in the Indian Ocean. Not long ago, American Government officials tried to confront this problem by

simply denying that an arms race is in progress.* Whatever the United States is doing in the Indian Ocean, they said, is not prompted by Soviet activities, so the United States is not engaged in an arms race. But this argument, perhaps because it seems to be based more upon a fine semantic distinction than anything else, has not been persuasive. No one even tries to deny that there has been a decided increase in naval activity by the two superpowers during the past eight years. The sequence of events during 1975 in which Congress voted funds to expand the communication facilities on Diego Garcia into a fullblown logistics support base only after being confronted with evidence that the Soviet Union was building a base in Somalia, offers

*" We are not in an arms race with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, and our requirements for a facility at Diego Garcia are related to an entire spectrum of U.S. interests and considerations, only one of which bears on the level of Soviet deployments there." Testimony of Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in The Indian Ocean (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 27. Mr. Weiss apparently saw no implication of an arms race or contradiction with the above statement in another statement he made which closely followed it: "We seek nothing more than an ability to stage forces in the area similar to the ability the Soviet Union presently has using port facilities at Berbera in Somalia and Aden plus the anchorages they routinely use off the island of Socotra."

persuasive evidence that the activities of the two superpowers are related.* And even if conclusive evidence could be produced to show that the United States is not acting in reaction to Soviet initiatives or vice-versa, the even more disturbing question would then inevitably be raised by the countries of the littoral as to what Soviet and American intentions really are and toward whom their activities are really directed.

So the American base on Diego Garcia is really a symbol, a vortex around which swirls a controversy that has many dimensions beyond the purely naval questions associated with it. The existence of the base has affected and will continue to affect the relations of the United States with many nations especially the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral.

* At the same Congressional hearing in 1975 during which Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger presented evidence of Soviet missile-handling facilities at Berbera -- evidence which eventually gained approval for funds to expand the Diego Garcia facilities -- another American official testified that there still was no arms race in progress, but this time the evidence was turned around to say that the USSR was not reacting to American initiatives: "We believe that the readily-apparent growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of their own perceived national interests, rather than as a reaction to U.S. force levels and/or facilities present as such. We do not believe the steps we are proposing will contribute to an arms race in the Indian Ocean." Testimony of George Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 62.

This is not to say that Diego Garcia has been a serious political liability for the United States, a critical problem of public relations for American foreign policy, an inflamed point of disagreement that has poisoned our relations with other countries. It has not. But neither has it been a positive political asset, despite the fact that advocates of the base argue that political and psychological considerations are important aspects of the base's utility. The periodic American naval operations in the Indian Ocean, which the base is designed to support, along with the base itself will, they say, reassure friends and allies and serve notice to potential enemies of American interest in affairs in the Indian Ocean area.* But the singular reluctance of national leaders

* "Our military presence in the Indian Ocean provides tangible evidence of our concern for security and stability in a region where significant U.S. interests are located. As such, it adds a security dimension to those other aspects of our policy -- economic, political, cultural -- which also reflect our interests and associations in the area." Testimony of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 53; "An American naval presence fulfills important political and military needs in the U.S. national interest. It is a substantial symbol of active U.S. support for our trade routes, for friendly countries and for the stability and peaceful evolution of relations in East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia." Testimony of J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Ibid., p. 3; "The U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean region provides a low profile but nevertheless positive indication of U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean region. It furnishes psychological reassurances to friendly littoral states." Testimony of Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), p. 173.

in the area -- no matter what their political persuasion or what their foreign policy orientation -- to express positive support for what the United States is doing gives reason to doubt whether the base is so perceived by the countries it is intended to reassure.

The man who was the long-time (1954-1970) Assistant Director of the Long Range Objectives Group under the Chief of Naval Operations claims credit for initiating in 1960 the efforts which kept Diego Garcia under British control and for authorship, in 1968, of the Navy's base study, which was the genesis of the existing base on Diego Garcia. He has explained the context in which the base was conceived and his objectives in recommending that it be established:

My objective with respect to Diego Garcia has always been to provide for the U.S. an inexpensive listening point and emergency support point covering a vast global area of great potential importance, whose use is free both of veto power by any nation (the US-UK agreement assures this) and of obligation to or entanglements with any of the scruffy nations of the periphery.³

This short statement may reveal more about why the base has generated so much controversy than its author intended it should or even suspected it could. The base cannot at once be a symbol of American interest in and concern about the countries and affairs of the Indian Ocean region and at the same time be completely divorced from them. If the base and the naval activities it is meant to support are to advance American interests in the Indian Ocean region, they are perforce entangled with the "scruffy nations" of that region, and the United States is working against its own best interests if it tries to deny that such a relationship exists or if the U.S. approaches the nations with which it exists in the spirit of this statement.

Even within the limits of an unclassified study, this paper does not pretend to consider in detail the history of the two superpowers' presence in the Indian Ocean; or all of the many ramifications -- economic, diplomatic, political, military -- of that presence; or the many possible motives behind Soviet and American activities; or the details of all the possible Soviet and American interests in the region -- e.g., trade, oil, fishing, space exploration support activities; or the possible influence of superpower activities in the Indian Ocean on affairs in Europe or East Asia. Such a detailed

investigation would require months of research and would demand several volumes to present its findings. Rather, this relatively short paper, as one of its principal purposes, is intended to consider in a general way only the most important points about the superpower presence, as an analyst, who lacks access to classified Soviet or American information but who has completed a moderately intensive though not exhaustive review of readily available information, might consider them -- i.e., how the superpower presence may look to a military or foreign policy analyst in a country of the Indian Ocean littoral. The policy recommendations in the paper are intended to be of a nature that might, if they were adopted, exert a positive influence on that analyst's perception of American policies and actions without exerting an adverse effect on other aspects of American policy or national security.

Hans J. Morgenthau, with characteristic insight, has written that "the ultimate aim of foreign policy is always the same: to promote one's interests by changing the mind of the opponent... All foreign policy, then is a struggle for the minds of men."⁴ In that struggle, it is always important to recognize that others' perceptions of issues seldom agree completely with our own. We must understand

what those different perceptions are and why they differ if we are, first, to be certain that our own perceptions are, in fact, correct and, second, to succeed in changing the minds of others so that their perceptions and our own more closely coincide. It is in the hope of contributing to the furtherance of this process with respect to American policy in the Indian Ocean and particularly the controversial base at Diego Garcia that this paper is written.

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN PRESENCE

In the course of the long debate carried on in Congress and in the pages of scholarly journals and the daily press over the base at Diego Garcia, it has become a cliché to repeat the obvious fact that the Indian Ocean lies on the opposite side of the earth from the United States. Years ago, someone pointed out that Trincomalee in Ceylon lies 11,500 miles from New York if measured westward and the same distance from San Francisco if measured eastward.¹ This geographic fact is obvious, even banal, but it is nevertheless important to remember, because it is one of the reasons why the long debate over Diego Garcia has continued for so long. It is geographically impossible for the United States to establish a naval base farther away from the United States, and that very remoteness remains a nagging question in the minds of those who question the wisdom of establishing a base in the Indian Ocean. Does the United States, they ask, really have interests of sufficiently increased importance so far away as to require a permanent naval installation where none has existed before?

From 1949 until sometime in the early or middle 1960s, leaders in the United States apparently felt that the Middle

East Force (MIDEASTFOR) based at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf was a naval force sufficient to look after American interests in the so-called region "east of Suez," the vast area stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. Through a good many crises over the course of fifteen years or so -- e.g., the troubled history of Iran during the 1950s typified by the tumultuous premiership of Mohammed Mossadegh; the Suez crisis of 1956 -- the tiny force of one seaplane tender and two destroyers remained unchanged, a seemingly permanent, immutable fixture.

One might reasonably ask whether a naval force as tiny and as isolated from its main fleet as MIDEASTFOR can really serve any useful purpose. That question was raised and discussed as recently as 1972 in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. That MIDEASTFOR's role is not, and really never could be, combative was affirmed in the committee's report.² In the course of the hearings, an official of the Department of Defense defined the mission of COMIDEASTFOR as being "to demonstrate, by visiting friendly countries in this far-away area, the continuing interest of the United States in these countries and the desire of the United States to maintain good relations with them."³ In other words, MIDEASTFOR's principal utility lies in its function as a visible symbol in the manner usually associated

with the traditional concept of naval presence: it is useful for "showing the flag." The same official went on to assert -- but without any supporting evidence -- that the mission was being carried out successfully: "Friendly governments in the area, including the new states of the lower Gulf, have accepted the continuing MIDEASTFOR presence as an indication of U.S. friendship, good will and interest."⁴ As to the future of the tiny force, he explained that, "there are no plans to increase the number of ships assigned to COMIDEASTFOR or to change his mission."⁵ Perhaps more importantly, he also explained that "the United States has assumed none of the former British military role or functions and has no intention of seeking or appearing to replace the British presence in the Gulf. We do not plan to make any security commitments to or develop any special military relationship with any of the newly independent states of the Gulf."⁶

Some years before those statements were made -- in the early or middle 1960s -- the United States Government had already decided that despite MIDEASTFOR's declared success in carrying out its assigned mission, the small force was not enough to serve American interests in the entire Indian Ocean as distinguished from the smaller Persian Gulf, that it had to be supplemented by something more -- the something more being

a base on the island of Diego Garcia.*

The history of the base on Diego Garcia is long and complicated, too long to recount here in any detail. Its tortuous legislative history, which has involved long, inconclusive debate and complicated parliamentary maneuvering that still continues, can be traced in the numerous committee hearings and floor debates that have been devoted to it. The precise origins of the base are hard to trace, but there is evidence that its history goes back as far as 1960.⁸ In 1964, a naval survey was undertaken on the island. In 1965, the British Indian Ocean Territory, which includes the Chagos Archipelago, which, in turn, includes Diego Garcia, was formed with Great Britain exercising sovereignty over it. In 1966, the United States signed an agreement with Great Britain which gave the United States base rights on the

*Terminology has assumed some importance in discussions about superpower naval activities in the Indian Ocean, i.e., whether what the Americans are building on Diego Garcia and what the Soviets are building at Berbera, Somalia, are bases, facilities or something else, the implication apparently being that a facility is smaller, perhaps less permanent and probably less threatening than a base. See, for example, John W. Finney, "The Soviets In Somalia: A 'Facility,' Not A 'Base,'" The New York Times, July 6, 1975, p. 3:3. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in his FY 1976 Annual Defense Department Report called the Diego Garcia installation a "modest base." "Base" and "facility" will be used virtually interchangeably in this paper, and this usage is not intended to imply anything about the extent, purpose or capabilities of the installations so described.

island. In 1967 another survey was undertaken, and in 1968, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a joint US/UK military facility be established on the island. A request for funds to do so was submitted by the Navy to Congress in the Fiscal Year 1970 military construction request. Thereafter, the history of the base is mostly the history of a long-running debate between the Executive and Legislative branches of the American government, with the Executive branch, mainly but not exclusively the Navy, seeking funds to build facilities on the island and Congress engaging in a see-saw battle with the Navy and within itself: sharply questioning, debating, disapproving, reconsidering, reluctantly approving, again reconsidering and again debating the Navy's requests.*

The nature of the facilities sought by the Navy for Diego Garcia has changed a good deal during the past eight years as have the reasons given to explain why they are needed. In an early report in the New York Times in 1965,

* "Debate" is perhaps a misleading description of what has transpired, because while Executive Branch officials have presented a single point of view in testimony before Congressional committees, opinions among members of Congress have been sharply divided with individual members espousing often directly opposing views. Nevertheless, the impression gained from the transcripts of the many hearings held over the past five years is of a debate between the Executive Branch on one side and certain members of Congress on the other.

mention is made of a planned American communication station to be built in conjunction with a presumably larger British base.⁸ But later, after base studies were made and negotiations with the British were conducted, the American installation evolved into an "austere logistical support activity which would serve mainly as a refueling stop for units operating in the Indian Ocean."⁹ It seems likely that as a British withdrawal from "east of Suez" became more and more apparent in the middle and late 1960s, plans for the British facilities failed to materialize, and the United States gradually took over the entire planned installation. When Congress in 1970 failed to approve funds for the larger facility, the Navy shifted its ground again in 1971 to request funds only for a "limited communications facility."¹⁰ This request was approved, and the facility has been built.

Despite the fact that in 1971 a communications facility clearly represented a fall-back position in the Navy's maneuvering with Congress, at hearings conducted by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in mid-1971, a representative of the Department of State implied that communications had always been the only reason for American interest in Diego Garcia:

I wish to emphasize that construction of this modest communications facility is not a sudden reactive response by the United States to a possible

Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean but rather is the culmination of our efforts to meet a naval communications requirement dating back to the early 1960s.¹¹

Whether or not there was some small measure of deception in this argument, as might appear, the shift in the Navy's position did nothing to dispel the suspicion that had begun to accumulate in some quarters about what the purpose of the base was. The circumstances surrounding the base's origins during the 1960s, including the circumstances surrounding the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territory and the US-UK base agreement, had been shrouded in a good deal of secrecy.* As the secrecy was peeled away layer by layer, mainly during public Congressional hearings, the suspicion that important secrets remain -- that the base involves important matters the United States Government was, and is,

*"A cryptic announcement in the House of Commons today lifted some of the secrecy from negotiations that have been going on for months." Anthony Lewis, New York Times, November 11, 1965, p. 8:3; "United States military spokesmen have always been uncommunicative about what goes on at the isolated base." "Work Continues on Diego Garcia," New York Times, December 26, 1975, p. 8.

unwilling to discuss publicly -- persists in many quarters.*

The 1971 hearings, which marked the first time Congress had focused on the Indian Ocean, proved to be a useful and informative public airing of a variety of views on the Indian Ocean and revealed the wide diversity of opinion inside and outside the government as to what the situation in the Indian Ocean region really was, what the Soviet Union and the United States were doing there and why, and what American policy towards the area should be. Representatives of the Departments of State and Defense emphasized the "austere" nature of the communications facilities being planned for Diego Garcia and stated that the United States had no plans to expand those facilities any further or to increase its activities in the Indian Ocean:

* That suspicion was reinforced in 1975 when the Department of State finally confirmed long-standing reports that the United States in 1966 had concluded with Great Britain a secret agreement under which the United States reduced the cost of Polaris missiles to Great Britain in return for establishing the base at Diego Garcia. The United States agreed to waive about \$14 million in research costs charged to Britain in the purchase of Polaris missiles for use on British submarines. The agreement also specified that Britain would assume responsibility for removing to Mauritius some 1,000 inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, of which Diego Garcia is a part. The revelation that residents of Diego Garcia has been removed from the island to make way for the base instantly became still another matter associated with Diego Garcia that exploded into public controversy in late 1975, this time in both the United States and Britain and perhaps most explosively in the U. S. Congress. New York Times, September 22, 1975, p. 10:1; October 17, 1975, p. 3:1; "Confirmation of Secret Deal on Diego Garcia," Congressional Record, September 30, 1975, p. S17112.

There appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control or even decisively to influence any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral, given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet and Chinese involvement. We consider, on balance, that our present interests are served by normal commercial, political and military access.¹²

In early 1974, nevertheless, Congress was again approached with a request for construction funds for Diego Garcia, this time to expand the communications facility already being built into a logistics support base much like the one originally planned. This approach was made, interestingly enough, not by the Navy but by the Department of State.¹³ Much had happened in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent in the three years since construction of a communications facility had been approved, and those events were cited in the subsequent lengthy hearings to show that changed circumstances had dictated the new request, notably the 1971 Bangladesh war, which had dismembered Pakistan and left India the undisputed dominant power on the subcontinent, and during which the United States and the Soviet Union had sent strong naval forces into the Indian Ocean; the 1973

Arab-Israeli war, which had prompted the painful Arab oil embargo and during which the United States had again sent an aircraft carrier task force into the Indian Ocean. The Navy was particularly concerned that it had proven very difficult to keep those naval forces supplied with fuel so far from their normal bases. The probability of MIDEASTFOR being excluded from Bahrein -- a possibility that had been discussed in 1971 -- was not, however, a motive for seeking expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities in 1974; in fact, during the 1974 hearings, administration officials specifically denied that the presence or absence of American forces at Bahrein was a reason for expanding the Diego Garcia facilities. What appears to have been the most important single reason for seeking expansion of those facilities -- since it was mentioned first and most prominently in the Department of State's initial letter to Congress seeking funds for expansion -- was the prospective reopening of the Suez Canal. Closed since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a reopened Suez Canal was seen as benefiting principally the Soviet Union by making much easier the support and possible expansion of its naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

This request for funds prompted even longer debate and more intricate legislative maneuvering than the 1970 and 1971 requests, and at this writing the end is not yet in sight. In brief, the 1974 request was deferred by a joint

House/Senate conference, without prejudice, in anticipation of a more complete examination of the request with the FY 1975 bill. A 1975 bill for \$18.1 million was approved but with extensive qualifications which held up actual obligation and carried over to the FY 1976 bill which called for an additional \$13.8 million. Both bills finally faced possible rejection by a resolution to disapprove any further construction introduced by Senator Mike Mansfield on May 19, 1975. His resolution might have been approved, thereby blocking any further construction, except for the disclosure by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to the Senate Armed Services Committee in June that the Soviet Union was building a naval base including missile facilities in Somalia. An American delegation visited Somalia in July, confirmed the essential accuracy of Secretary Schlesinger's charges, and their report as much as anything else appears to have contributed to the defeat of the Mansfield resolution.

In due course, the \$18.1 million for FY 1975 construction was approved by Congress and obligated, and construction using those funds has proceeded. The \$13.8 million for FY 1976 was approved, but the funds were not obligated. A House/Senate conference report, approved on November 19, 1975, directed that the funds be held up until April 15, 1976, so that an approach could be made to the Soviet Union for

the purpose of reaching some sort of agreement on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. The report said:

House conferees expressed agreement with their Senate counterparts that negotiations regarding mutual arms restraints in the Indian Ocean are highly desirable and should proceed at the earliest practical time.¹⁴

On April 15, 1976, the Department of State reported to Congress that no effort had been made to communicate with the Soviet Union about possible talks because "any such initiative would be inappropriate now." Senator John Culver, one of the most outspoken critics in Congress of the efforts to establish the base, described the report as a "curt rejection of the Congressional request," and Senator Edward Kennedy has referred to the "weak and lame explanations by the Department of State," so the lines may be drawn for another round of debate and it seems likely that the issue is not yet settled.¹⁵

The details of the expanded facilities sought by the Navy have been clearly and publicly delineated, and in the midst of so much disagreement, one thing at least does seem certain: the base as described can be no bastion or stronghold, no defensive anchor as, for example, Singapore was thought and meant by Britain to be in the years immediately

preceding World War II. Diego Garcia is a low, small, flat atoll, and in this age of long-range missiles, any facilities built upon it would be very hard to defend, much less to use for launching significant offensive operations in time of war, even a limited conventional war. The base, then, would appear to have little utility in the event of all-out war, especially a war pitting the two superpowers against each other. Because the island is so small, the facilities built upon it must perforce be relatively modest, at least as compared with American bases at such places as Subic Bay or Pearl Harbor. It should also be noted that representatives of the Defense Department have emphasized that warships will not be stationed permanently at Diego Garcia. The base, they say, does not imply the creation of a new American fleet in the Indian Ocean. The base will be used only to supply American naval vessels sent into the Indian Ocean from time to time.

But bastion or not , the base (as described by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt when he was Chief of Naval Operations as it will be if all the Navy's plans are brought to fruition) is, except for the small number of personnel the Admiral says will be stationed there, enough to arouse some feelings of uneasiness among the countries of the Indian Ocean littoral about what the United States may be up to:

This facility will be capable of providing support for a flexible range of activities including ship and aircraft maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, and improved communications. It will also provide for the operation of ASW aircraft in support of naval forces. The current supplemental military appropriations recently presented to Congress contains a request for \$29 million to improve the facilities on Diego Garcia. Specific projects include increased fuel storage capacity, deepening of the lagoon to provide an anchorage which will accommodate an aircraft carrier and its escorts, lengthening of the existing 8,000 foot runway [to 12,000 ft.] and expanding the airfield parking area, in addition to certain improvements to our existing communications facility and the construction of additional personnel quarters to accommodate a total of 609 people. We believe that if we are to have an assured capability to deploy and support U.S. forces into the Indian Ocean area, the facilities we now propose at Diego Garcia are essential.*

*Elmo Zumwalt, "Strategic Importance of Indian Ocean," Selected Material on Diego Garcia, p. 31. The amounts of money mentioned by Admiral Zumwalt and in the requests for funds submitted to Congress are perhaps misleading with respect to how much the base is actually costing to construct. As of June 10, 1975, the sum of \$69,997,000 had actually been spent. Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, p. 38. Estimates of the cost of the completed base have ranged as high as \$173 million.

The question that lies at the heart of the controversy over the proposal for a full-fledged logistical support base quite simply is: why does the United States need an assured capability to deploy and support forces into the Indian Ocean area or, more precisely, why does the United States need an increased capability as represented by this new base over and above what it had before? What has changed in the past five or ten years?

A truly surprising number of important issues connected with American foreign policy have been invoked in efforts to answer this question, to challenge or defend the need for an expanded logistical support base: The need to assure continued access by the industrialized nations to Middle Eastern oil supplies; the relations of nations of the third and fourth worlds with each other and with the two superpowers; the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas; strategic nuclear deterrence; the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" and all that implies in terms of how foreign nations perceive the ability and will of the United States in the wake of the Vietnam debacle to defend itself and its allies, and so on.

The common theme running through all these issues has been the specter of a recently expanded Soviet navy and its disquieting -- to the United States Navy, at least -- forward deployment in waters where Soviet warships seldom ventured before. In the 1971 Congressional hearings mentioned above, Defense and State Department representatives prominently

mentioned the presence of Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean, but denied that plans for Diego Garcia were tied to that presence.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in subsequent testimony before Congressional committees, Executive Branch officials have increasingly invoked the Soviet naval presence as the reason why the United States needs a new base in the Indian Ocean.

On June 10, 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger appeared before the Senate Committee on Armed Services to reveal the details of the Soviet base in Somalia and to argue for the funds to expand the Diego Garcia installation. He succinctly summed up the view of the Department of Defense on the situation in the Indian Ocean, a view which apparently continues today.

Although we would strongly prefer to see no Soviet buildup of military presence in this region, it appears that the USSR intends to undertake such a buildup. Since an effective military balance is essential to the preservation of regional security and stability in this area of great importance to the economic well-being of the industrialized world, we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence. In a period of historical transition toward a new set

of power relationships, only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to insure that the balance is maintained.¹⁷

CHAPTER III

THE SOVIET PRESENCE

The first incursion by Soviet warships in any strength into the Indian Ocean is usually dated from March, 1968. A detachment of units from the Soviet Pacific Fleet, which included three surface combatants, entered the Indian Ocean and visited nine ports in eight countries over a period of 3½ months.¹ A second deployment occurred at the end of the same year by a force of approximately the same size, and by the end of 1969, a continuous presence had been established. By mid-1970, a regular deployment cycle was established in which ships deployed from the Pacific Ocean remained on station in the Indian Ocean about five or six months.² The number of ships on station at any one time increased slowly but fairly steadily over the years from a total of about 10 or 11 including 4 combatants in 1971 to a total of about 19 ships, including 8 or 9 combatants, by mid-1975.³ Since then, the numbers have remained constant.⁴ The composition of a typical Soviet contingent on station in the Indian Ocean in mid-1975 was as follows:

- 1 guided-missile destroyer
- 2 destroyer-escorts
- 1 diesel-powered attack submarine
- 1 intelligence collector
- 2 minesweepers
- 1 tank-landing ship

support ships included

2 or 3 naval-merchant oilers,
a barracks ship, a stores ship,
and occasionally a space support
ship.⁵

The number of ships on station has been increased significantly at certain times. At the time of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, additional ships were sent into the Indian Ocean following the dispatch of the U.S.S. Enterprise by the United States, and for a brief period in early 1972, the number of Soviet ships reached 20 combatants (13 surface and 7 submarines). When the Enterprise withdrew, most of the Soviet ships did likewise, and the Soviet presence reverted to its normal level.⁶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the number of Soviet combatants reached 14 (10 surface and 4 submarines). As had happened during the 1971-72 crisis, an American aircraft carrier task force was also present, this time in the Arabian Sea. As in 1971-72, when the American force withdrew, the number of Soviet vessels again reverted to "normal."⁷ During the so-called OKEAN world-wide Soviet naval exercises in early 1975, the number of ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately double the normal number, and for the first time they were supported by maritime patrol aircraft from airfields in Somalia.⁸

Before the Suez Canal was reopened, much attention was given to what effect the reopened Canal might have on Soviet

naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. As mentioned above, the prospective reopening of the Canal was an important consideration which prompted the Departments of State and Defense to seek funds in 1974 to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia. Some experts speculated that since a reopened Suez Canal would significantly shorten the distance a ship must travel to go from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union might send units from its Black Sea fleet to expand its Indian Ocean contingent.

Since the Canal was reopened in June, 1975, available evidence seems to indicate that it has not been used by the Soviet Union either to increase the contingent in the Indian Ocean or even to replace units there. Six weeks after the Canal was reopened, the first Soviet warship had yet to transit the Canal although Naval vessels of the United States, Britain, France, Iran and even Oman had already done so.⁹ By early November, Soviet ships had accounted for about 12% of the merchant traffic that had passed through the Canal, more than any other single nation, but of the 43 naval vessels that had transited, only a handful had been Soviet: a destroyer, some tank-landing ships and one or two oilers.¹⁰ In mid-December, seven Soviet ships passed through the Singapore and Malacca Straits apparently to replace ships on station in the Indian Ocean, thus apparently following the established Soviet practice of replacing units in the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Fleet.¹¹

A few general conclusions can safely be drawn about the Soviet naval vessels stationed in the Indian Ocean during the past eight years. The Soviet contingent, even when augmented during the periods of crisis, has had virtually no capability to project power ashore in the manner of an American supercarrier task force. The Soviet combatant force, composed of submarines and surface combatants armed mainly with conventional guns, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, is designed almost exclusively to fight and sink other ships. The normal contingent has an only slightly better capability to wage effective anti-submarine warfare. Individual ships have that capability, but such a small number of ships with very limited air support cannot hope to cover an area the size of the Indian Ocean or even the Arabian Sea with any degree of effectiveness. From Secretary Schlesinger's statement that "only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to ensure that the balance is maintained" one might infer that the Soviet contingent is operating in a relative power vacuum with no other significant Western naval force present unless the United States maintains a balancing presence. But such is not the case. For example, in early 1976, the French naval forces on station in the Indian Ocean were by themselves equal in strength to the Soviet contingent, and in April, the French government announced its intention to keep a force

of 20 warships in the Indian Ocean "indefinitely," no matter what the final disposition of the French base at Djibouti may be.¹² Finally, the small number of Soviet ships normally on station, the relatively small size of those ships, and the enormous area in which they are presumably expected to operate, leads to the almost inevitable conclusion that the combat potential of the Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean is very limited and that the only real utility of those forces can be little different from MIDEASTFOR's: i.e., to "show the flag."

In addition to the naval vessels on station, another aspect of the overall Soviet naval presence that has received a good deal of attention has been the Soviet-built base at Berbera in Somalia. The details of that installation, including the fact that it contains facilities for storing missiles, were first revealed to the world-at-large by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on June 10, 1975. Dr. Schlesinger's assertions that a base, built and manned by the Soviet Union and containing facilities for handling missiles, existed on Somali soil drew denials from the government of Somalia and from the press (but not the government) of the Soviet Union. The Somalis went a step further and issued an invitation to members of the American Congress to visit Somalia and see the truth for themselves. The invitation was

accepted by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Senator Dewey Bartlett, representing the Committee and accompanied by a team of American experts, visited Somalia from July 3 to 6, 1975. The visiting Americans were welcomed by the President of Somalia, were given surprising freedom of movement, and found, to their surprise, that a Soviet-built base, manned by a group estimated to number from 500 to 1,500 Russians and including missile-storing facilities, exists pretty much as described by the Secretary of Defense.¹³

Various theories were advanced to explain the motives behind the Somalis' rather puzzling behavior in all this. Their invitation to the Americans could have done nothing to improve Somali-Soviet relations. One theory, keyed to remarks made by Somalian President Mohammed Said Barre to the visiting Americans, suggested that the Somalis hoped to get some American aid.* The explanation given by the Somalis themselves as reported by the New York Times did make some sense:

Some officials expressed the hope that, if the United States were to resume aid, such action would influence the anti-communist Arab governments of the Persian Gulf area to whom Somalia

*Senator Bartlett in his report suggests nine possible motives including the aid motive. Ibid., p. 20.

had appealed for help. "To break out of our isolation," a Somali official said, is one of his government's main objectives in inviting the Americans to Berbera.¹⁴

Senator Bartlett's report of what he saw in Somalia appears to have exerted considerable impact in Congress and may have saved the impending appropriations bill for funds to expand the Diego Garcia facilities from disapproval by the Mansfield resolution. The Senator's report, though, does not describe a major military bastion any more than does the description given by the U.S. Navy of the proposed Diego Garcia base. The Senator described the facilities he saw as having "significant military potential" rather than existing capability, but he also pointed out that the facilities were still under construction when he saw them, and their full scope when completed could not be accurately determined. The "high point of the trip," according to the report, was the opportunity to see the inside of a Soviet missile facility. The visitors, however, did not see any missiles. The closest they came to doing so was to see one Styx missile crate.¹⁵ Inside the facility they did see crates of 122 millimeter artillery ammunition and 37 millimeter ammunition (which were improperly stored). They were admitted to one large (30 by 250 feet) storage bunker which was empty, but were refused entry into another similar one.

The two reports submitted by the team to Congress give step-by-step, item-by-item accounts of what the team did and saw.¹⁶

It seems obvious that the Soviet decision to build the base at Berbera must have been taken some years after the American decision to construct facilities on Diego Garcia. The regime currently in power in Somalia did not even come into power until 1969, by which time plans for Diego Garcia had already been drawn up. While there is no specific evidence that the Soviet and American decisions were connected -- that construction of one base prompted the construction of the other as a reaction -- it is possible that the Soviets may have moved in reaction to the earlier American initiative.

However, the later American decision to expand the communications facilities already built on Diego Garcia into a logistics base did finally come to rest almost entirely on the argument that because the Soviets were constructing a major base in Somalia, the United States needed a base as a counterweight. In this connection, the issue of Diego Garcia turned up again (like a bad penny, one is tempted to say) in May, 1976, in a publicly aired controversy (the end of which is not in sight at this writing) involving Saudi Arabia and the Soviet presence in Somalia. A former American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia testified before a Congressional Committee that Saudi Arabia had offered, at about the time Congress was considering the proposal to expand the Diego Garcia facilities,

to cooperate with the United States in supplying aid to Somalia. The aid was intended to replace the aid Somalia was receiving from the Soviet Union, and supplying it was intended to wean the Somalis away from the Soviet Union. The United States, according to this testimony, was asked to supply to Somalia military aid which Saudi Arabia would pay for. According to the former Ambassador, the United States ignored, or at least failed to respond to, this offer. The Ambassador said that a colleague in the Department of State told him that the reason for this failure to take action in what appears to have been an effort conceived in the best interests of the United States was that Soviet influence in Somalia had become the principal justification for expanding the Diego Garcia facilities, and if that influence were reduced or eliminated, the justification would disappear. Evidence that the United States failed to respond to the Saudi proposal for this reason or even that Saudi Arabia ever actually made the proposal -- evidence, that is, independent of the Ambassador's assertions -- have not yet been placed on the public record. A Department of State spokesman declared that "the Saudi issue has no relationship at all to our decision to build up Diego Garcia." He said further that the Ambassador's testimony was misleading, that the Ambassador was not aware of all the facts, and that the situation was "far too complex for me to go into in any detail." He

said finally that he could provide no assurances that he would ever be able to offer more information on the subject.¹⁷

The incident triggered a sharp outcry in Congress, prompted mainly by the fact that Congress had not been told about the alleged Saudi offer. At this writing, Senator Culver has introduced into the Senate a resolution, co-sponsored by Senators Pell, Symington and Kennedy, to suspend once again construction in the Indian Ocean area. The resolution was referred on May 6 to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In introducing the resolution, Senator Culver called for "a full-scale investigation by Congress of the administration's military expansionist policies and cold war cover-up in the Indian Ocean." Senator Mansfield charged that the Congressional delegation which had visited Somalia in July, 1975, had planned to visit Saudi Arabia as well but had been dissuaded from doing so by the Department of State. "The Senate would have found out about the offer, the Administration would have been embarrassed, and the Senate judgment /to allow/ expansion of the facilities on Diego Garcia might very well have been different," Mansfield declared on the floor of the Senate. Senator Stuart Symington said of the incident that "this is the most dishonest thing I have heard in 30 years in Congress."¹⁸

It seems obvious that an American decision to supply arms aid to Somalia would impact adversely on American

relations with Ethiopia. Ethiopia and Somalia appear to be moving towards a confrontation over the French protectorate at Djibouti, which lies between them in the Horn of Africa, as the French prepare to grant independence to Djibouti, and it seems clear that, under these circumstances, any proposal that the United States supply arms aid to Somalia would have to be carefully weighed against the inevitably adverse effect such aid would exert on the close and friendly relations the United States has maintained with Ethiopia for many years.¹⁹ The best course of action for the American government to follow in this kind of complex situation is neither obvious nor easy to determine, but the United States might indeed be well advised to ignore a proposal of the sort allegedly made by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Ambassador's allegations about the Saudi offer and the Department of State's public response to them did nothing to convince opponents of the expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities that the arguments advanced to support that expansion were valid and offered in good faith or that the expanded facilities are needed to counter the Soviet presence in Somalia. At this writing, the incident has served to revive once again the sharp debate within the American Government over the base on Diego Garcia.

The information generally available about Soviet naval vessels and facilities in the Indian Ocean is drawn almost exclusively from non-Soviet sources, especially American

sources, and the official Soviet position with regard to the Soviet presence has received relatively little attention -- probably because the Soviet government has been willing to say so little and most of that little has a distinctly propagandistic ring. Nevertheless, what little they have said does merit attention in any consideration of their naval activities. In a letter, dated June 18, 1974, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN stated the official Soviet position:

The Soviet Union has never had, has not established and is not now establishing any military or naval bases in the Indian Ocean region. Soviet ships and vessels have never posed a threat to anyone in that region. In accordance with the existing rules of international law and with universally accepted international practice, they are engaged in training cruises and in the search for and recovery of Soviet space craft that splash down in the Indian Ocean. It must also be borne in mind that transit routes from the European part of the USSR to the Soviet Far East pass through the Indian Ocean and that accordingly, in order to ensure the safe passage of ships and vessels, the Soviet Union is conducting scientific investigations in the region.²⁰

The letter added that "normal duty calls by naval ships at various ports for the purpose of replenishing their supplies" should not be "tendentiously depicted...as the establishment of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean Regions." Most Soviet public statements have reiterated the basic argument of this statement, along with one other argument: The argument that the Soviet naval presence serves to neutralize Western imperialist aggression. As early as 1968, Soviet Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Sergeyev used this argument when he said:

The presence of the Soviet fleet has repeatedly interfered with imperialist aggressions against the developing countries.²¹

Despite the paucity of information from Soviet sources and the possible inaccuracy or at least the misleading nature of what little there is, the numbers and kinds of Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean, the length of time they spend there and the ports they visit, are facts relatively easy to document, and there has been a good deal of information published on those subjects.²² The reasons the Soviet Union has sent them there and the effects their presence has produced are questions harder to answer, and those questions have provoked a good deal of speculation. The timing of the first incursion in March, 1968, for example, has attracted attention. At the 1971 Congressional hearings mentioned above, one expert witness pointed out that the first Soviet

incursion occurred only about one month after Britain announced its plans to withdraw its forces from East of Suez. He opined that the two events had occurred "perhaps by coincidence but this seems unlikely" thereby suggesting that the Soviets were rushing to fill a power vacuum created by the impending British withdrawal, and he even went so far as to suggest that before 1968, "the Soviets were probably inhibited in introducing their navy into such a long-established British preserve" -- surely a proposition very much open to question.* If the Soviets were reacting to anything, what seems much more likely was that by March, 1968, American activity in the Indian Ocean had begun to attract the attention of the Soviet Union. The facts have already been presented but will bear repeating: the British Indian Ocean Territory had been formed; two naval surveys on Diego Garcia had taken place; the base agreement with Britain had been signed; and

* Testimony of Alvin J. Cottrell, Director of Research, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 69. The argument that the British announcement created a military vacuum for the Soviets to fill or that a British military and naval presence east of Suez deterred the Soviet Union from entering the Indian Ocean before 1968 was effectively countered by Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer some years before Professor Cottrell testified. See Edwin Reischauer, "A Broad Look At Our Asian Policy," New York Times Magazine, March 10, 1968, p. 108.

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were on the point of recommending construction of a logistics base.* It is also worth noting that the first Soviet deployment occurred less than one year after the installation in 1967 of Andrei Grechko as the Soviet Defense Minister. While there appears to be no direct evidence that the decision to deploy in the Indian Ocean represented a change of policy introduced by the new Defense Minister, that possibility ought not to be ignored completely.

Whether the decision of the Soviet Union to send naval vessels into the Indian Ocean for the first time was a reaction to prior American and British actions or, as Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified in 1975, the truth of the matter is the other way round and the United States is only now reacting to a prior Soviet buildup in order to maintain a military balance is a question that has assumed some measure of importance in the minds of those in the countries of the Indian Ocean littoral who charge that a naval arms race between the two superpowers is in progress.

* As early as 1964, the Soviet Government took public notice of what the U.S. and Britain were doing. In an official statement, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that attempts by the U.S. and Britain to establish new military bases in the Indian Ocean were "contrary to the clearly expressed will of the peoples of that region /and/ merit resolute condemnation." United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Officials Records, No. A/5827. Letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs, USSR, to President of General Assembly, dated December 7, 1964, p. 4.

A line of reasoning introduced some years ago, which still has currency, suggests that the principal reason for Soviet deployments -- not the only reason, but the main one -- has been a defensive effort to protect the Russian homeland from an American Polaris threat in the Indian Ocean. An Indian journalist, for example, has asserted the "fact" of the motive behind American interest in the Indian Ocean:

The fact...is that the Americans desire to acquire a firm foothold in the Indian Ocean not because it is threatened by increased Soviet naval activity, but because its location to the south of the Soviet Union ideally suits them for placement of their underwater long range missiles.²³

This statement has some importance, not for the "fact" it alleges, but as an example of a belief that is still widespread. By this line of reasoning, the Soviets in deploying warships into the Indian Ocean are regarded as acting in a perfectly understandable and reasonable manner to defend their country from attack, and an element disturbing to the littoral countries -- strategic nuclear weapons -- is introduced into the Indian Ocean debate.

CHAPTER IV

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Most Western naval experts have agreed with Michael McGwire, one of the West's leading authorities on the Soviet Navy, in his assessment of the primary mission of that navy:

The development and deployment of the Soviet Navy will continue to be primarily determined by the requirement to counter the West's seaborne strike capability and field her own deterrent units.¹

If this mission is the primary reason for Soviet deployments in the Indian Ocean, as some experts have argued, what evidence might the Soviet Union possess that the United States actually has a seaborne nuclear strike capability stationed there? As long ago as early 1968, an Indian military analyst summed up readily available evidence that seemed to support the idea that the U.S. had, or would soon have, ballistic missile submarines directed against the Soviet Union deployed in the Indian Ocean:

The U.S. has built a VLF communication station at Northwest Cape in Australia and this is part of a global network with other stations being located at Cutler (Maine), Japan, The Canal Zone, Maryland and Seattle. The Australian

station is stated to be many times more powerful than the others, and in addition a wireless station has also been built at Asmara in Ethiopia. The communication in VLF band enables submerged submarines to receive signals without surfacing. This would indicate that U.S. nuclear hunter-killer and ballistic missile submarines are operating in the Indian Ocean. Before the Poseidon and Polaris A3 missiles were developed, the Polaris missiles A1 and A2 had ranges of 1,380 and 1,785 miles. Because of the limitations on their range with reference to main Soviet target clusters, it was necessary to station most of the Polaris submarines in the Arctic Ocean. The Poseidon has a range of 2,900 miles and 31 out of 41 U.S. ballistic missile submarines are to be fitted with Poseidon missiles. The target clusters of Moscow, Kiev, Baku and Tashkent are now within range of submarines with Poseidon missiles operating from the Arabian Sea. The Arctic ice pack presents certain problems to navigation, communication and accuracy of the exit angle of fired missiles and these problems are not met within the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. There is a possibility of megaton weapons exploded deep under water in a pattern to destroy

submarines lying over a wide area. It is likely that this type of anti-submarine technique can be used more effectively in arctic and polar regions. This may be a reason why dispersion of ballistic missile submarines to the Indian Ocean is considered a strategic necessity by the U.S. This, in turn, is likely to bring into the Indian Ocean the Soviet nuclear hunter-killer submarines to keep watch on the U.S. missile submarines and the Soviet missile submarines assigned targets like the communication station in Australia.²

More recently, Michael MccGwire has repeated the essential points of this evidence, added the facilities at Diego Garcia as the third link of an Asmara-Diego Garcia-Northwest Cape chain of communication stations stretching across the Indian Ocean, and concluded:

On the basis of this evidence, Soviet strategic planners could hardly conclude otherwise than that the United States was developing (at considerable expense) the capability to operate submarines in the Indian Ocean. And since there was no realistic role for U.S. attack submarines in the area (which anyway could rely

on existing communications systems), it could only be concluded that these new facilities were intended to provide the necessary command and control for ballistic missile units.*

* Michael McGwire, "The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71," Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context, p. 439. A similar line of argument has been proposed by other respected experts to reach similar conclusions: "Introduction of Polaris A3 and the later Poseidon with similar range of about 2,800 nm /has made/ the Arabian Sea the second-best deployment area in the world, only slightly inferior in its range of targets to the eastern Mediterranean." Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean," Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, p. 311. Jukes goes on to say that "There still is no sign that Polaris/Poseidon boats visit the Indian Ocean," but he adds that "This does not, however, mean that the Polaris/Poseidon factor can be left out in examining why the Soviet Navy deployed into the Indian Ocean in the first place, and why it is still there." Still other experts go further and argue that it is likely that the United States does, in fact, have SSBNs in the Indian Ocean. The following is one such statement: "The February, 1974, issue of Seapower, the magazine of the Navy League, in discussing the U.S. communications facility in Australia at Northwest Cape stated that 'classified messages to Polaris/Poseidon submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean are sent from this station.' (Unclassified official evidence of the presence of Polaris/Poseidon submarines in the Indian Ocean is available in the Navy map of SSBN patrol areas that I have attached to my statement). It is likely that the U.S. Navy intends to deploy SSBNs in the Indian Ocean more frequently in the future as additional Poseidon submarines with longer-range missiles enter the inventory and as the Trident submarine is acquired." Testimony of Gene R. LaRoque, Rear Admiral (Retired), U.S. Navy, and Director, Center for Defense Information. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 92. Additional evidence to substantiate Admiral LaRoque's assertions appeared in the New York Times in late 1975: "Operations are expanding at the naval communications station on Diego Garcia. United States Navy sources say the station sends low-frequency radio messages to American Polaris submarines and monitors radio traffic from Soviet vessels...United States Navy sources say that American Polaris submarines were venturing into the Ocean as early as 1971." "Work Continues on Diego Garcia," New York Times, December 26, 1975, p. 8.

Other well-qualified observers, however, have argued that this evidence is not persuasive, and they have described the idea that American Polaris submarines are patrolling in the Indian Ocean as a rather surprising misconception for Soviet planners to entertain:

Our government has never announced such deployments; there is no need for them at the present time. There would be a requirement if our submarines deployed elsewhere were in jeopardy or if the Soviets had an effective ABM -- since an Arabian Sea launch would add a complicating angle of approach -- but the Russians have neither capability. According to Rear Admiral Levering Smith, who runs the Polaris program, not once in more than ten years of operation have the Soviets detected a single submarine on patrol. If Polaris submarines were in the Indian Ocean, there would have to be a tender in the area. Otherwise, Indian Ocean patrols would actually detract from our deterrent posture, by appreciably reducing total on-station time. It takes only a few days for the submarines serviced by tenders at Holy Loch, Rota or Guam to reach their stations in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and

Pacific. No one contends that we have a tender in the Indian Ocean. This would be visible and everyone would know about it. From where, then, would boats deploy? Transits from the continental U.S. and even from Rota would be prohibitively time-consuming, devouring the entire 60 days allotted for the standard patrol. Guam is closer, but even here more than half of the patrol period would be used in passing to and from an Arabian Sea station. What planner could justify such a wasteful expenditure of American strategic resources, just to have another launch point that offers no significant advantage over existing ones?³

During testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia in 1974, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, in an exchange with the Subcommittee Chairman, commented on the possibility that counter-*ing* Polaris is a mission of the Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean:

Mr. HAMILTON. Take a look at the possible Soviet naval missions in the Indian Ocean that we have listed and, using our terminology or your own, if you prefer, describe to us what you think the Soviet naval -- or, if you prefer, military -- missions are in the Indian Ocean.

Admiral ZUMWALT. On quick examination the only one I believe I would comment on is the "counter U.S. Polaris activity." They would not have that opportunity under any plans we now have with regard to Polaris submarines.

MR. HAMILTON. What do you mean by that?

Admiral ZUMWALT. We won't have them there.⁴

Unfortunately, the Admiral's last remark was not clarified, so it remains somewhat ambiguous on two counts. "Won't" seems to imply a future reference rather than the past or present, so the statement can be construed as saying nothing about the presence of Polaris submarines before 1974. "There" seems to refer to the Indian Ocean as a whole since that was the subject at hand, but it could possibly refer only to Diego Garcia and thus would not preclude the presence of submarines elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. It is not necessary, of course, that submarines actually be based at Diego Garcia for the base there to play a role in the strategic nuclear effort: it can serve as a communications link to exercise command and control and as a platform for ASW forces to operate against Soviet hunter-killer submarines. Those two minor ambiguities in Admiral Zumwalt's remark having been pointed out, it nevertheless seems clear that his meaning was that the United States in 1974 did not have deployed and had no plans to deploy ballistic missile submarines

in the Indian Ocean. Any other interpretation requires an unreasonable twisting of words or an unreasonably narrow interpretation of meaning -- e.g. "Polaris" referring only to submarines actually armed with Polaris missiles rather than, in the now customary usage and as the congressmen apparently intended, referring as a generic term to American ballistic missile submarines in general.

This perhaps overly exhaustive analysis of Admiral Zumwalt's testimony is offered only because the testimony seems particularly significant. The exact location of American ballistic missile submarines while on patrol is, of course, very highly classified information. For the Chief of Naval Operations in public testimony to discuss where those submarines are or are not located, even in a general way, seems a bit unusual. It is very unlikely that he would speak carelessly, so his testimony must be regarded as significant evidence that American SSBNs are not deployed in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union for years has charged repeatedly that the United States has deployed, or has had plans to deploy, SSBNs in the northern sectors of the Indian Ocean.⁵ Perhaps the most significant such statement was made in a book entitled Submarines Against Submarines published in 1968. Published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the book was reviewed by high-ranking SOVIET officers and must there-

fore be regarded as something more than simply propaganda for external consumption. The book discussed Polaris deployments in the north Atlantic, eastern Mediterranean and Pacific Oceans, and went on to say:

In the future, the Americans intend to extend these regions by including the northern part of the Indian Ocean in the combat patrol sphere.⁶

Only a handful of people in the United States know for sure whether the United States has deployed, or has plans to deploy, ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, and only a handful of people in Russia know for sure whether Soviet naval forces on station there were sent there primarily to counter a submarine-launched missile threat. But military planners, as we all know, proceed from assessments of the capabilities of a potential enemy rather than from his apparent intentions. So long as ballistic missiles launched from the Indian Ocean can reach important targets in the Soviet Union; so long as the United States has the ability to deploy ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean; and, most importantly, so long as there exists some evidence, however slight, that the U.S. has, indeed, made, or has plans to make, such deployments, the Soviet Union must be presumed to be taking some sort of precautions against that threat, especially in view of the fact that

such defense is the primary mission of the Soviet Navy. That Soviet forces now on station have little or no hope of succeeding in countering a missile threat is not necessarily reason to think that Soviet deployments are not prompted by an intention to do so:

While it is true that the USSR does not currently possess the capability to locate and destroy enemy nuclear submarines and that Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean do not currently constitute an anti-submarine strike force, it may be assumed...that Moscow is hard at work in an effort to develop such capabilities. In the meantime, the Russians are busy in the Indian Ocean, laying the necessary groundwork, i.e., conducting oceanographic research and establishing the kind of facilities network required to maintain such a capability, once created, far from Soviet territory.⁷

As early as 1964, the Soviet Union announced its support for the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Indian Ocean.⁸ It has been suggested that this move may have been an effort to forestall what appeared at that time to

to be American preparations for deploying SSBNs in the Indian Ocean.*

One can only conclude that the likelihood or even the bare possibility that strategic nuclear weapons constitute an element in the superpower naval equation in the Indian Ocean must be regarded as profoundly disturbing by the nations of the Ocean's littoral, the presence of such weapons opening up, as it does, the prospect of the Indian Ocean being part of an arena for a future strategic nuclear confrontation. That frightening thought can only serve to reinforce the hope and determination of those countries, enunciated in the past with almost complete unanimity, to find some means, somehow, to eliminate superpower naval rivalry from the Indian Ocean.

*

Jukes, p. 311. It should be noted that the Soviet support for the nuclear-free zone idea was expressed only as a passing reference in a general discussion of disarmament, reducing tension and nuclear-free zones world-wide. If it was, indeed, an effort specifically prompted by American activities in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Government did not put any emphasis on that particular aspect.

CHAPTER V

THE REACTIONS OF THE LITTORAL COUNTRIES

In response to requests by Congress, the Department of State in 1974 and 1975 completed country-by-country analyses of the reactions in littoral countries to the proposed expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia. The analyses were based upon canvassing done by the American embassies in those countries. From the results, as published in two separate Congressional committee documents, it is not altogether clear whether canvassing was undertaken on two or three different occasions. It was definitely done once in 1975; in 1974, it may have been done once or twice. However many times it was done, the results as published are worth examining in some detail.¹

On March 6, 1974, during the hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia mentioned above, the Subcommittee Chairman asked a State Department official who was then testifying for the results of a State Department canvass apparently already taken. The results were supplied to the subcommittee and were published in the transcript of the hearings. Six days after the House hearings, on March 12, during hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Defense Department official was asked for similar information which was supplied to the committee. It was reported

in a form slightly different from the House information, so it is not clear whether the two tabulations are based upon the same data; they seem to differ slightly. A little more than one year later, in mid-1975, another canvass of reactions was undertaken, and the results were published together with the above-mentioned Senate information from 1974.

The 1974 House information was tabulated according to "official" and "press/public" reactions in 30 countries. The reactions were classified under five headings: "favorable," "balanced," "negative," "unfavorable," and "no reaction." Unfortunately, the meanings of those terms were not explained, so it is not clear, for example, what the difference is between "negative" and "unfavorable" or exactly what "balanced" means. The tabulation for "official" reactions showed 7 favorable, 4 balanced, 1 negative, 5 unfavorable and 12 no reaction. "Press/public" reactions were 1 favorable, 7 balanced, 3 negative, 7 unfavorable and 12 no reaction. Thus, the single reaction most often reported was "no reaction" which occurred 24 times, and of a total of 60 tabulated responses, only 8 were favorable, while 16 were either unfavorable or negative.

The 1974 Senate information is reported differently. Reaction in each country is described in a few sentences of text, so it is hard to determine whether the same data was used as for the House information. The overall results seem

to be essentially the same, but there are some slight differences. For example, the House information reports press/public reaction in South Africa as "favorable," but the Senate information describes press reports in South Africa as "balanced." The House information tabulates official Ethiopian reaction "favorable," press/public as "balanced," whereas the Senate information reports, "no official Ethiopia comments" and "no editorials and very little press reporting." The House information reports official reaction in Yemen as "favorable," while the Senate information reports that in Yemen "mid-level Government reaction was confined to the one word 'good'" -- surely a slender reed on which to hang a "favorable" rating. And there were a few other apparent minor differences.

The results of the 1975 canvass, done in 29 countries, was summarized with a single reaction recorded for each country and classified in one of four categories: "favorable," "balanced," "unfavorable," and "unknown." The results as reported were: favorable -- none; balanced -- 4; unfavorable -- 12; unknown -- 13.

It is obvious that important decisions affecting foreign and defense policy should not be made on the basis of this kind of off-the-cuff polling, nor should they be made solely on the basis of what public or official opinion in foreign countries appears to be. Hans Morgenthau, for one,

has gone to great lengths to demonstrate that a world public opinion simply does not exist.

Nevertheless, if a nation's military forces are to serve the needs of its foreign policy, if navies are indeed the handmaidens of diplomacy as someone has suggested, then military and naval policy must take into account at some point what kind of reaction it is likely to evoke in foreign countries -- especially the policies of a superpower with interests and involvements world-wide. So the results of the State Department polling should not be dismissed out of hand, because they probably do indicate what the general thinking among the countries of the Indian Ocean periphery is with regard to Diego Garcia. In many, perhaps most, of the countries -- the smaller countries with very small or non-existent navies and few maritime interests -- there is little or no reaction to American actions, because the people in those countries have other things they consider more important to worry about. But in the large, influential countries, the countries with navies, with significant maritime interests and foreign trade -- in short, the important countries regionally and even globally -- there is a reaction to American activities on Diego Garcia, and it is, for the most part, opposed. Support is given only reluctantly, and those countries giving it are usually unwilling to declare their support publicly. And if the State Department's information is at all accurate, the trend seems to be toward not less, but more opposition.

Efforts to counter that opposition were not enhanced by a controversy that erupted in the latter half of 1975 concerning the resettlement of inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia -- inhabitants said to number about 1,000 -- to Mauritius about 1,174 miles away. The resettlement had been carried out by Great Britain some time between 1965 and 1974 as part of the series of events by which the British Indian Ocean Territory was formed and base rights granted to the United States. Controversy exploded in the United States and Britain over what appeared to be a forceable and rather callous removal of people from their home in order to make way for a military base. In Congress, there was resentment because before approving funds for the base, Congress had been led to believe that Diego Garcia was uninhabited.² Congress was not entirely without blame itself, however, because the fact that the island did have a population, if only a very small number of itinerant fishermen, was reported in the press as early as 1965.³ Nevertheless, Congressional critics were incensed by what they considered deception by the Executive Branch, and more hearings were held.* The Soviet Union, predictably, exploited the opportunity thus presented to castigate the United States and Britain.⁴ The controversy gradually died down in late 1975 in part because the removal of the

* The hearings were held on November 4, 1975.

people had long since been completed and in part because, it turned out, the people had been compensated by the British Government for moving. But the incident, implying, as it did, callousness, deception and unwarranted secrecy on the part of the United States Government in a matter involving not national security but only national embarrassment, did nothing to lessen opposition in Congress or among the littoral countries to the base. Soon after the Congressional hearings were held in early November, Congress decided to hold up the 1976 funds until April 15, 1976, so that the Soviet Union could be approached about arms limitations.⁵

Space does not permit a review of what all the littoral countries have said about Diego Garcia, even though in a great many cases there would be little or nothing to report. But there have been some public statements by some of the larger countries that are worth reviewing briefly.

India is the largest and on balance the most important country in the Indian Ocean region (unless one wants to consider the countries of the Persian Gulf region to be the most important because of their oil reserves). India has the third largest army in the world, a large navy at least by the standards of the area and, after Japan, the largest maritime fleet in Asia. It is also the country that has most persistently and most vigorously opposed establishment of the base on Diego Garcia while strongly advocating the idea of

making the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" free from Great Power rivalries.

The trend in Indian Foreign policy during the past ten years or so has been noticeably towards closer relations with the Soviet Union. In August, 1971, the two nations signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which only confirmed what had been an increasingly obvious trend for some years.* Some observers have argued that the traditional Indian policy of non-alignment, so closely identified with Jawarharlal Nehru, changed during the 1960s into a policy of de-facto alignment with the Soviet Union.⁶ The Indian Government denies that it has abandoned non-alignment. But if it has, Indian Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan, in a speech before the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) in April, 1975, offered an insight into why the policy had taken a new direction:

The External Affairs Minister unequivocally stated today that India did not equate the Soviet Union with the U.S.A. in regard to their relationship with this country. Relations with the Soviet Union were qualitatively different from those with the U.S.A. from the

* The relationship of the two events may have been purely coincidental, but it is nonetheless interesting to note that India signed the treaty with the Soviet Union only about one month after President Nixon announced his forthcoming visit to the Peoples Republic of China and thereby signalled a fundamental change in the relationship of the United States with the country India considers its most dangerous potential adversary.

point of view of Indian's national interests, he declared amid cheers in the Lok Sabha, and added that the USSR had stood the test of friendship. "Whenever India was in difficulty, the Soviet Union stood by us," he said.*

It may be tempting, in the face of statements like this, to regard India as simply a client state and mouth-piece of the Soviet Union and to dismiss Indian protestations about Diego Garcia and an Indian Ocean zone of peace as simply reflecting Soviet views. This interpretation is

* Times of India, April 17, 1975, p. 3. An Indian analyst recently offered an explanation as to why the policies of the two super-powers vis-a-vis India have been, or at least have appeared to India to be, so different: "To the Soviet Union...the region was of far greater strategic importance /than it was to the United States in 1963-68/ given both its proximity to the Soviet Union and its location at the southern underbelly of China. India was of far more crucial importance to the Soviet Union than it could ever be to the U.S. India could count on the Soviet Union with greater reliance than on the U.S." Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India Seriously," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1975, p. 145. Despite India's obvious official "tilt" toward the Soviet Union, a significant body of opinion in India still advocates seeking better relations with the United States. As late as October, 1975, months after the official State of Emergency clamped tight controls on the Indian press, the Times of India editorialized: "In the realm of foreign policy, it should hardly be necessary to make the point that with the remarkable comeback it has staged in West Asia, the U.S. has regained its preeminent position in the world and it makes no sense for New Delhi to ignore the advantages of normal relations with it...The task of Indian policy makers in befriending oil-rich Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the U.A.E. can be unnecessarily complicated by the absence of reasonable understanding with Washington." Times of India, October 15, 1975, p. 5.

all the more tempting because Indian statements advocating a zone of peace almost always mention Diego Garcia and condemn the United States by name but seldom specifically mention the Soviet Union. But it would be wrong, most experts on India have agreed, to assume that Indian policies are dictated from Moscow or that the Indian Government speaks as a surrogate for the Kremlin. India obviously values highly the friendship and support of the Soviet Union, but India is simply too large and too important regionally if not globally to be a client state whose policies are dictated anywhere but in New Delhi. In any event, actual implementation of the zone of peace proposal, the course of action India has so strongly and so persistently advocated, would affect the Soviet Union no less and perhaps even more than it would the United States.

As early as 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared opposition equally to American or Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean:

India [is] against any country having naval bases in the Indian Ocean whether it [is] the Soviet Union, the United States or the United Kingdom ... India treats all countries alike.⁷

But when the Soviet-built base at Berbera was revealed to the world in mid-1975, the Indian Government still refrained from openly condemning the Soviet Union, much to the

satisfaction of those who had long charged that India is far from even-handed in its attitude towards the two super-powers as a true policy of non-alignment would seem to demand. Indeed, as late as May, 1976, Prime Minister Gandhi, in a discussion with a group of Iranian journalists, said that the main difference between the Soviet and American presence in the Indian Ocean is that the Soviet Union has no bases, whereas at Diego Garcia the United States not only has a base, but an "atomic base" (a charge for which she later admitted she had no evidence).⁸ Nevertheless, an editorial published in the Hindustan Times -- a newspaper which has usually reflected official Indian thinking -- after the existence of the Berbera Base had been confirmed, makes informative reading:

Even if it be true that the Soviet Union has naval base facilities at Berbera, two wrongs do not make a right. The most effective way for the U.S. to counter the Soviet Union in order to maintain a balance of power in the region would be to mobilize world opinion in favor of leaving the Indian Ocean free of superpower rivalries and competitive base-building. Such a move could gain strong support from the Indian Ocean littoral states.⁹

During 1975, three other countries in communiques issued jointly with India expressed their continuing and active support of the zone of peace idea: Egypt on May 30, Indonesia on August 1; and Iran on November 4. The wording of the joint Indian-Indonesian communique, issued in New Delhi upon conclusion of an official visit by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, is indicative of the strong support given to the zone of peace idea by the two countries:

The two sides expressed concern over the lack of progress towards the realization of objectives of establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in accordance with resolutions adopted by the United Nations. They called on the Great Powers to act with due restraint and to cooperate in efforts towards creating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. They expressed hope that steps contrary to the attainment of that objective and detrimental to peace and stability in the region would be avoided.¹⁰

Australia is probably the only littoral nation to reverse completely its official stand on Diego Garcia and the peace zone proposal. The former Labor government of Gough Whitlam was openly and outspokenly critical of American plans to expand the facilities on Diego Garcia.¹¹ But the new coalition government of Liberal and National Country Parties

under Malcolm Fraser, voted into office in December, 1975, has reversed that stand. The new government has indicated a greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on defense matters. The new Defense Minister has specifically welcomed American development of Diego Garcia and has said that the Australian base under construction at Cockburn Sound will be available to American Navy ships, probably including nuclear-powered vessels.¹² What seems significant in the Australian position, though, is not that the new government now supports what the United States is doing, but that an Australian government ever outspokenly opposed it, and that a significant body of opinion in Australia apparently still opposes it. Another change of government could obviously bring another reversal of policy.

Iran, while supporting the zone of peace idea, has been much less outspoken about it than has India and has said little or nothing about Diego Garcia. Iranian official reticence and even ambivalence on the subject has reflected the delicate maneuvering of Iranian foreign policy between the two superpowers.* Unlike India, Iran does not insist

* "Unlike the early cold-war era when Iran took political stands on the side of the West in the U.N., Iran today tends to abstain or to take the least controversial stand, to avoid disconcerting either Moscow or Washington. One result has been a tendency to defer excessively on those issues which are of vital interest to either superpower in international forums, and to avoid the cultivation of an assertive role in international politics on issues marginal to its national interest." Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1974), p. 297.

on mention of the peace zone proposal in every joint communique: the joint Iranian-Indonesian communique, issued on June 30, 1975, at the conclusion of the state visit of Indonesian President Suharto to Iran, included mention of the zone of peace proposal, whereas the joint Iranian-Singapore communique issued after Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan-Yew's visit to Iran in September, 1975, contained no mention of the proposal.¹³ Iran, like India, is a regional power that aspires to play an even stronger regional role, but Iranian attention in the past has focused more on the Persian Gulf than on the Indian Ocean. In 1969, the Shah spoke in favor of the United States basing naval forces at Diego Garcia, but only because it seemed to him an attractive alternative to the Americans doing so at Bahrein in the Persian Gulf:

Do as the Russians do: show your flag, cruise in the Persian Gulf. But base your ships on those islands in the Indian Ocean -- the Seychelles or Diego Garcia.¹⁴

In April, 1976, the new Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Ali Kala Bari, outlined what he called a "new Iranian foreign policy tendency" which, he said, "can be described as a more careful look to the East ... particularly India." He said it was too early to explain the new policy in detail, but he said that the Indian Ocean as well as the Persian Gulf

would be the new policy's focal point.¹⁵ One aspect of the new policy seems to place particular emphasis on the idea -- not a new one -- that regional collective security by the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean littoral states should replace foreign military presence to guarantee regional peace and stability. During a visit to India in May, Iranian Prime Minister Ami Abbas Hoveyda said Iran would like to see the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean free from big power rivalry, and the safety and security of the region assured through collective security by the littoral states.¹⁶ * The success of the Prime Minister's visit seemed to indicate further progress towards closer Indo-Iranian cooperation, including, perhaps, agreement on a policy forthrightly calling on both superpowers to withdraw from the Indian Ocean. During his visit, Hoveyda said that there is "tremendous scope for cooperation" between India and Iran, and, in fact, "the sky is the limit" for such cooperation. He explicitly expressed strong opposition to superpower rivalry and said that India and Iran "see entirely eye to eye" in all such matters."¹⁷ Despite the Prime Minister's effusive remarks, some observers felt that any complete agreement by the two countries about the Indian Ocean might prove to be more apparent than real.¹⁸ But there are other indications of movement towards closer Indo-Iranian cooperation including the formation in April, 1975, of the Irano-Hind Shipping Company, a joint venture reported to have turned a healthy profit in 1975.¹⁹

If Iran and India actually do see eye to eye on the question of superpower naval presence and are really moving towards closer relations, one result of that movement might well be even more outspoken opposition in the future to the superpower presence -- more opposition to the American presence by Iran and more opposition to the Soviet presence by India -- and even stronger support for the peace zone idea by two of the strongest and most important countries of the Indian Ocean littoral.

Iraq, like Somalia, is a country thought to be strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, though perhaps not to the same degree that Somalia is influenced. In the 1971 vote in the United Nations General Assembly on the peace zone resolution, no vote was recorded for Iraq (Somalia voted in favor of the resolution), and the results of the State Department polling in 1974 and 1975 on reaction to Diego Garcia show no reaction for Iraq, presumably because there was no opportunity for any polling since the United States and Iraq do not maintain diplomatic relations. However, Iraq has publicly supported the peace zone idea. In an interview on April 25, 1975, Dr. Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, said that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace and "cleared of all foreign military bases, regardless of their political coloring and size." He endorsed the Iranian

idea of regional collective security, and he said that Iraq wished to consult with Iran and other Persian Gulf states on establishing "security structures" to replace foreign military alliances along the Persian Gulf.²⁰

The Department of State canvassing in 1974 and 1975 was done with reference only to American activities in Diego Garcia. If a canvass were taken in the countries of the littoral to determine reactions to the peace zone proposal, which addresses itself to the activities of both superpowers, the results would unquestionably show virtually unanimous approval for the proposal and unanimous opposition to superpower activity. That proposal has attracted very little attention during the Diego Garcia debate. It has been mentioned only in passing and has never been examined in any detail in any of the Congressional committee hearings. In view of the support it has attracted among the littoral countries, it is worth examining in a little detail.

CHAPTER VI

A ZONE OF PEACE

The littoral countries base their efforts to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace upon a resolution adopted in the General Assembly on December 16, 1971, during the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations. It was adopted by a vote of 61 votes for, no votes against, and 55 abstentions (see Annex B for the text of the declaration and details of the 1971 UN vote). The declaration has prompted continuing discussion in ensuing General Assembly sessions, and an ad hoc committee exists to pursue efforts to implement the declaration. The committee met seven times during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in 1975. Its efforts were bent primarily towards convening an international conference aimed at implementing the peace zone resolution. Not much was accomplished, but some hope was expressed that a conference can be convened in late 1976 or in 1977.¹

The peace zone declaration, popular as it is among the littoral countries, has suffered from a number of drawbacks, not the least of which is its name. The very term "zone of peace" carries for many people a connotation of high-minded but impractical, visionary hope impossible to translate into practical reality. It recalls such undeniably laudatory but foredoomed efforts as the Kellogg-Briand

Pact of 1929 which called on all nations to forego the use of war as an instrument of national policy. To others, the name no doubt smacks of cynical and devious Communist terminology in which freedom really means slavery, democracy really means totalitarianism and peace really means war -- an attempt, in other words, to bamboozle people somewhat in the same manner as the Devil quoting the scriptures to his own advantage. The declaration probably also suffers from having been adopted in the United Nations where, more and more people have come to believe, it is common practice to adopt resolutions no one really believes in, resolutions couched in high-flown verbiage having little or no reference to practicality or reality.

The United States abstained on the vote in 1971 to adopt the declaration (as did the Soviet Union), and American officials have dismissed the declaration out of hand mainly on the grounds that it would inhibit freedom of the seas, an historic concept the United States has always strongly supported.* But the text of the declaration specifically supports the traditional idea of peaceful freedom of

* "We abstained on that vote ... because it constitutes in effect a move on the part of certain states to impose a regime on the high seas. While there may be good reason in the eyes of certain countries from time to time in wanting to do this, the interests of the United States in a global sense require us to take unswervingly the position that the high seas are not to be limited by any group of nations, particularly by

navigation on the high seas, so it is hard to understand how the declaration can be rejected as contrary to that principle:

3.(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected.

The "foregoing" refers to two clauses which are really the heart of the declaration and which do call for two self-limiting actions by both the Great Powers and -- it is important to note -- also by the littoral countries: the Great Powers to eliminate "all bases, military installa-

those who simply happen to be on a particular ocean." Testimony of Owen Zurhellen, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 8; "While we sympathize with the principles which motivate some of the nations in the area to promote concepts like the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone," all major maritime powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have been doubtful about a special right to limit or control the use of the high seas by others. The United States has long held the view there must be unimpaired freedom of navigation on the high seas." Testimony of Seymour Weiss, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. Ibid., p. 27; "Since 1970, a group of ... nations have been pursuing the Indian Ocean peace zone concept. Of course, nobody is against having a peace zone, but they have made a major diplomatic initiative impinging on our interests. This, of course, as I say, while we have nothing against the concept per se, cuts across the traditional desire of maritime nations to have freedom of access, freedom of the seas in terms of warships." Testimony of James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, Ibid., p. 63.

tions and logistical support facilities;" and all countries to ensure that "warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland state." It is important to note that the declaration would be implemented only by means of an international conference to which all maritime users of the Indian Ocean have already been invited.

Since adoption of the declaration, deliberations by the Ad Hoc Committee On The Indian Ocean offer further evidence that the peace zone declaration would not jeopardize any freedom of peaceful navigation:

The view was expressed that freedom of navigation should be subject only to the reasonable and necessary jurisdiction of the coastal state over its access and the right of the coastal state to explore and exploit the adjacent natural resources and to protect its environment;²

It must be agreed, as stated explicitly in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, that the regime of the peace zone would at every stage guarantee the use of the Indian Ocean for peaceful purposes, including commerce and merchant shipping, that the passage of warships across the Indian Ocean would be permissible

provided their passage or presence is not a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland states or prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of these states.³

By those terms, freedom of peaceful navigation on the high seas would clearly not be affected by a zone of peace agreement; But according to the present body of law of the sea as set forth by the Geneva Convention of 1958, use of the high seas for aggressive military purposes is not denied, either. To that extent, the peace zone declaration in inhibiting under certain conditions the use of the Indian Ocean by warships and military aircraft would presumably represent a modification of the existing body of law of the sea. But that body of law is now undergoing significant modification by the on-going U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, so that body of law is by no means sacrosanct, and modification is not an idea whose time has not yet arrived -- it is here. Adherence by the United States to unimpeded freedom of navigation under any or all conditions is being modified now by the effort in Congress to establish a 200-mile fishing and perhaps economic zone -- an effort which might well be regarded as modifying absolute freedom of the seas to a greater degree than would the Indian Ocean peace zone declaration. That the peace zone declaration does

not really pose a serious threat to the principle of freedom of the seas is perhaps indicated by the fact that the great maritime powers did not actually vote against it in 1971, they only abstained. In summary, though, it is true that the peace zone proposal, if approved in its current essentials, would represent a modification to some degree of current law of the sea, and that fact must be recognized in any consideration of the proposal.

It is obvious that the peace zone declaration is not an international agreement ready for signing and enforcement. The text says clearly that it is only a call for "immediate consultations" first by the Great Powers with the littoral states and secondly by the "littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean" among themselves. The declaration is a statement of principle, of intent, a goal towards which the consultations would work. It is definitely not a detailed, take-it-or-leave-it proposal. To translate it into a practical agreement capable of producing tangible, worthwhile results would require defining terms, expanding general statements of principle into precise formulae for action and even specifying precisely such basic matters as the exact geographic limits of the area in question.*

* The range of estimates that have been given for the size of the Indian Ocean -- a matter of geography that one might reasonably expect was settled a long time ago -- has been truly astonishing. "17 million square miles, excluding the Arctic Ocean." Auguste Toussaint,

Even as a general statement of principle and the question of freedom of the seas aside, the declaration does pose some problems. For example, it seeks to prohibit warships and aircraft from using the Indian Ocean not only for the use of force but also for the threat of force, surely a difficult situation to determine. Does the presence of a warship at a time of crisis or when hostilities seem imminent constitute per se a threat of force, especially if the warship belongs to a country not directly involved in the crisis and is engaged in apparently innocent passage? At first glance, the answer would appear to be "no", but one man's innocent passage may be another man's threat. Even more difficult to translate into a formula for action is the clause seeking to eliminate any manifestation of Great Power military presence but only if "conceived in the context of Great Power Rivalry." This appears to be an escape clause of some sort, inserted for no readily apparent reason, which presumably would permit a Great Power to maintain a military presence so long as it is not so conceived. But how is such a determination to be made?

"Shifting Power Balance In The Indian Ocean," The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance, p. 3; "The Indian Ocean itself is the third largest ocean in the world comprising more than 28 million square miles." Testimony of James Noyes, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 52; "The world's third largest ocean, encompassing some 58 million square miles." Howard Wriggins, "U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean," The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance, p. 369.

Is there any real possibility that the peace zone declaration can be translated into a workable international agreement, or is it simply too divorced from reality ever to offer any real hope of implementation? Unless a conference is convened to address the many problems that the declaration as it now stands poses, this question cannot be answered with any certainty. Any conference must, of course, be approached with great care and even circumspection. Without careful, detailed preparation, such a conference could all too easily become bogged down in endless hairsplitting, acrimonious debate and futile wrangling, and thereby produce worse results than if no conference were held at all. One thing does seem certain. Unless the Great Powers -- i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union -- embrace the concept embodied in the declaration, cooperate in convening a conference, participate in the conference and seek to implement its recommendations, the declaration can have no hope of any real success. This necessary condition for success -- cooperation of the two superpowers with each other and with the many and diverse littoral countries -- may in itself seem such a remote possibility as to effectively preclude any prospect for success.

Slim though its prospects for success may seem the peace zone declaration is not a dead or forgotten issue, especially among the littoral countries. The Ad Hoc

Committee in the United Nations consists of 19 members, two of which -- China and Japan -- are leading world powers and not countries of the littoral or hinterland holding parochial views about the Indian Ocean. The committee expects to continue its efforts to convene a conference which would include the superpowers. In a letter dated March 31, 1975, to the littoral and hinterland countries, the Committee Chairman (Mr. Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka) explained:

As regards the question of participation, it would seem that the proposed conference could provide an opportunity for an exchange of views not only among the littoral and hinterland states, but also between that group of states and the Great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. It may be recalled, in this connexion, that resolution 3259 (XXIX) (1974) renews its invitation to the Great Powers, in particular to cooperate in a discharge of its functions.⁴

So if the United States plans to continue its opposition to the peace zone declaration, it will probably have to continue to ignore or decline invitations to participate in a conference.

Past American and Soviet negotiations on reductions of arms and military forces -- notably the Strategic Arms

Limitations Talks and the negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe -- have focused on questions affecting the vital national interests, indeed the very survival, of the two countries. Probably for that reason, both sides have been exceedingly wary and hesitant to compromise, negotiations have been long, and results have been rather meager. By contrast, negotiations between the two superpowers about the Indian Ocean would concern an area of vital interest to neither side (though admittedly probably of greater interest to the USSR than to the United States). Both sides could afford to compromise, to take more flexible positions than in SALT or MBFR. Accordingly, an agreement on the Indian Ocean might be reached more quickly and easily by the two superpowers than would an agreement on any other likely subject for negotiation.

Many steps remain to be taken before a successful agreement could be concluded, so it is much too early to be able to say what form an agreement would take or how it would be implemented if all interested parties would decide to pursue an effort to do so. And if a successful agreement could be reached and implemented, it seems questionable whether a true zone of peace could ever be achieved. Even if superpower naval and military forces were reduced or withdrawn altogether, the naval and military forces of the littoral countries would remain. India, Iran

and perhaps others among the littoral countries are engaging now, in concerted efforts to build up their naval forces by acquiring modern, major combatant units.* Long-standing regional and local quarrels, hatreds and rivalries would still exist as ever-present fuel for a spark of crisis to ignite into open hostilities.

But if the superpower presence can be minimized, local and regional conflicts could more easily be kept limited to local or regional proportions and would be much less likely to escalate into a global superpower confrontation. To that extent, the peace zone declaration could be the first step toward achieving, if not certain and total peace in the Indian Ocean, at least limited scope and intensity for any future conflict there.

* For an excellent discussion of recent trends in the development of the Indian Navy, as well as other regional navies like the Iranian Navy, see Raju G.C. Thomas, "The Indian Navy in the Seventies," Pacific Affairs, Winter, 1975-76, p. 500-518. For basic data on the navies of major littoral states as they were in mid-1975, see Annex C.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Based upon what is known definitely about Soviet and American naval activity in the Indian Ocean, "arms race" seems an overly harsh term to describe what has occurred during the past 8 or 10 years. The Soviet naval contingent normally on station and the American MIDEASTFOR, which is still the only American naval force permanently on station, are too small and weak to be competing in what is usually thought of as an arms race. The bases at Berbera and Diego Garcia are both relatively modest installations that -- so far -- have not posed a threat to anyone. The additional naval forces introduced by the two superpowers from time to time aggravate the normal situation but do not change its character. But though "arms race" may be an inappropriate description of what has occurred, it is clear that the activities of the two superpowers have been related and have served to stimulate each other. To that degree, a competition if not a race has clearly been in progress, official American assertions to contrary notwithstanding, and the foundations, both material and psychological, have been laid for an arms race. Whether strategic nuclear weapons are an element in this competition is known only to a relatively small group of people in the United States and the Soviet Union. Many

expert observers have argued persuasively that the deployment of submarines armed with ballistic missiles by the United States is the key to understanding the naval activity by the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean.

The littoral countries have expressed almost unanimous opposition to the recently stepped-up superpower naval activity and have called on both superpowers to cooperate with each other and with the littoral countries in seeking implementation of the proposal to make the region a so-called zone of peace. What little support there has been for the activities of the United States on Diego Garcia has been expressed rather reluctantly, usually not publicly, and only in support of the idea that if the forces of one superpower (the USSR) are present, it is better to have the other present, too, as a counter-balancing force. The American claim that it is acting only in reaction to Soviet initiatives in order to maintain a military balance has thus evoked what little support there has been for American policy. But that American claim has been shown to be open to challenge. Those who challenge it say that the United States, rather than reacting to Soviet initiatives in order to maintain a balance, provoked a Soviet response by its efforts to establish a base at Diego Garcia years before the first Soviet contingent sailed into the Indian Ocean and, more importantly, by deploying in the Arabian Sea ballistic

missile submarines against which the Soviet Union is reacting in perfectly justifiable self-defense.

The interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region are more limited than in any other populated area of the world. American officials testifying before Congress in 1971 said as much, though it is interesting to note that in the 1974 hearings on Diego Garcia, American interests were described as much more important and in much more need of protection than they had been three years before, although this changed description was not justified by reference to any events.* Middle Eastern oil supplies and the need to assure continued access to them by the industrialized nations of the world are usually cited as the principal interest of the United States.² In this context,

*"The Indian Ocean is of less strategic importance to the United States than other oceanic regions such as the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the North Pacific in the current context of world security posture. Vital sea lines of communication of the United States do not cross this ocean, and no littoral state is of direct strategic importance to the security of the United States." Testimony of Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, (ISA) Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs. The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 171. In 1974, another official of the Department of Defense began his testimony by saying, "at the outset, I would like to emphasize my own conviction that the long-term objectives of U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean have not been altered by the effect of recent events." Nevertheless, he went on to describe the Indian Ocean as "this increasingly important area for our national security." Testimony of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 51.

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the base at Diego Garcia is seen as important to support naval forces which would protect the sealanes over which tankers carry oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe, Japan and the United States. Europe and Japan depend almost entirely upon Middle Eastern oil. In contrast, only a small though increasing percentage of the oil used by the United States originates in the Middle East (7.9% in 1974).² Nevertheless, protecting the sealanes in the Indian Ocean is cited as an important interest of the United States and a sufficient reason for establishing the base at Diego Garcia.

This line of argument has been questioned on at least two counts. Some years ago, Edwin Reischauer questioned the need for the United States to assume responsibility for protecting sealanes important mainly to Europe and Japan:

The sea lanes through the area [the Indian Ocean] do not lead us anywhere. The resources and trade of the whole Indian Ocean region are not vital to the United States, and therefore their denial through local warfare or internal instability would not seriously affect us. The impact on the Japanese economy would be more serious, and even Western Europe would be discomfited, but not the United States. Even for Japan and Western Europe, it

is only the oil of the Persian Gulf that is vitally important . . . Why do Japanese and Western Europeans, who have very clear national interests at stake in the Indian Ocean area, look with equanimity -- one might even say complacency -- on the prospects there, while Americans who have no clear national interests at stake, feel that they face an agonizing decision? This paradox perhaps best illustrates what is basically wrong in our relationship with Asia.³

The likelihood that the Soviet Union would employ its forces in the Indian Ocean to blockade the Persian Gulf or to sink oil tankers bound for Europe and Japan has been rejected as scarcely credible by more than one expert observer:

Fears have been expressed of a Soviet blockade of the Persian Gulf, the source of almost half the oil consumption of Western Europe and 90% of Japan's. This is scarcely credible. It would only alienate the Arabs, who have nowhere else to sell their oil; the Soviets themselves do not need it. More important, a blockade would mean war with NATO. It is conceivable, of course, that the Soviets might want prepositioned forces in the Indian Ocean which, if war did come with

the West out of accident or miscalculation, could then carry out interdiction of the vital air flow. But interdiction is a job for submarines, not the surface ships which comprise the bulk of the Soviet Indian Ocean contingent. All this is aside from the fact that the Russians have appreciably downgraded the anti-shipping mission anyway.⁴

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 was not the work of the Soviet Union, and it occurred despite the presence of an American task force in the Arabian Sea. In the event of another such embargo -- the only really likely means by which the Middle Eastern oil flow would be cut off again -- American naval forces supported by Diego Garcia would be of little value to change the situation except as a means to seize the oil fields by force -- another scarcely credible scenario.*

*The far-reaching, serious political implications of such a scenario aside, a study by the Congressional Research Service for the House Committee on International Relations concluded that from a purely military point of view an attempt to seize the Middle East oil fields by force would have poor prospects for success: "Military operations to rescue the United States (much less its key allies) from an air-tight OPEC embargo would combine high costs with high risks wherever we focused our efforts. This country would so deplete its strategic reserves that little would be left for contingencies elsewhere. Prospects would be poor, with plights of far-reaching political, economic, social, psychological and perhaps military consequences the penalty for failure." U.S. Congress. House, Committee on International Relations, Oil Fields as Military Objectives (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 76.

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
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It seems clear that the United States has no vital interests -- however that elastic term is defined -- in the Indian Ocean and that, moreover, the Indian Ocean is more important to the Soviet Union than it is to the United States: as a maritime link between Asian and European Russia, as a fishing ground and as a launching area for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (aimed at the Soviet Union in the case of the United States or at China in the case of the Soviet Union). The Indian Ocean has importance, too, for Soviet space efforts. But it is an area in which the United States is not forced by considerations of national security to react to every Soviet initiative. Nothing likely to happen in the Indian Ocean, not even a cut-off of the flow of Middle Eastern oil, will directly and in itself threaten the security of the United States. This is not to say that nothing that happens in the Indian Ocean is important to the United States or that nothing that happens in the Indian Ocean could conceivably give the United States valid cause to take strong military action. It is simply to suggest that in matters connected with the Indian Ocean, the United States has room for diplomatic maneuver and compromise and that a possible misstep does not mean disaster as it might and likely would in negotiations on SALT or MBFR. The Indian Ocean is an area in which the United States can take initiatives toward reducing international tension, can pursue bold and unusual proposals at very little risk.

If the United States were to reverse its present stand and indicate its acceptance of the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, that reversal of policy would not set a far-reaching, calamitous precedent working against American interests with respect to freedom of navigation on the high seas. It would not mean that the United States must forthwith abandon the base at Diego Garcia, withdraw MIDEASTFOR or even curtail its operations, or refrain from sending additional warships into the Indian Ocean from time to time. It would not endanger interests important to the security or well-being of the United States. It would actually commit the United States to very little, only a willingness to enter into consultations about the Indian Ocean -- nothing else.

Unfortunately, as has happened so often in the past, the Soviet Union has already beaten the United States to the punch. Despite its abstention on the 1971 U.N. vote, the Soviet Union has publicly endorsed the peace zone proposal at least in a general way. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit of Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka to Russia in 1974 said in part:

The Soviet Union supports this idea aimed at abolishing national sovereignty and independence of states and at abolishing the military bases in that area [the Indian Ocean].

Both sides reaffirmed their readiness to take part, together with all other countries concerned and on an equal footing, in seeking a favorable solution to the problem of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace in keeping with the principles of International Law.⁵

So by one simple gesture costing nothing, the Soviet Union has placed itself in a relatively advantageous position. So long as the United States continues to oppose the peace-zone proposal, the Soviet Union can reap diplomatic and psychological advantages at no cost whatever by supporting the idea.

It is not too late for the United States to change its position. To do so would place the United States in a much better relationship with the nations of the Indian Ocean littoral the United States counts as its friends and allies. It would constitute a challenge calling for a Soviet endorsement of the peace-zone proposal not only with words but with deeds. It would cut the ground from beneath those countries that have condemned American policy for so long (e.g., India). Instead, it would put pressure on them to call upon the Soviet Union to respond to the American willingness to negotiate and would constitute a challenge, moreover, that some of these countries might welcome. Countries which only privately and reluctantly have supported the United States would be encouraged

even pressured, to do so publicly. Even a country like Somalia which appears to be so firmly in the Soviet orbit, might be affected. In this connection, it is notable that Senator Bartlett, in his report on the Soviet facilities in Berbera, raised the possibility that United States - Somali relations might be improved if the right effort was made:

The Somali Government has opened the door to better United States-Somali relations and thereby it may be possible to defuse or at least minimize the developing Soviet potential at Berbera.⁶

In short, this one simple maneuver by the the United States could significantly improve American relations with many countries of the Indian Ocean littoral.

The United States could, of course, confine its acceptance of the peace zone proposal to a statement couched in generalities, a statement simply accepting in principle the ideas embodied in the proposal and expressing a willingness to enter into negotiations. But an even better course of action might be to go a step further and offer a proposal, more or less concrete, placing some definite limitation on naval armaments in the Indian Ocean belonging to non-littoral states somewhat along the lines of the Montrieux Convention on the Black Sea. The limitation could be according to the

number of vessels present at any time, their tonnage, some combination of the two, or perhaps some other means of measurement. Any such proposal would presumably have to be limited to surface ships, since the presence of submarines is obviously difficult to detect and substantiate. But even limitations only on surface combatants would be a useful goal and, equally important, one that would probably prove relatively easy to attain. A specific proposal along these lines would convincingly demonstrate that the United States is, indeed, committed to avoiding an arms race in the Indian Ocean and would constitute a very specific challenge to the Soviet Union calling for a definite and specific response.

If, as seems entirely possible, the Soviet Union -- for whatever reason, either by outright refusal to cooperate or more subtly by procrastination, obfuscation, or perhaps simply failure to reply -- should fail to respond positively to the American initiative, the United States would have lost absolutely nothing and gained much. American naval activity, including further development of the facilities on Diego Garcia, could then proceed in the certainty of less regional opposition and probably significant regional support. Any continuing opposition would be persuasively countered by pointing out that the United States had already acted in the interests of regional peace; the onus would be on the Soviet Union for failing to respond positively.

The Soviets might not respond positively, but available evidence indicates that they probably would do so. A Congressional delegation visiting the Soviet Union in 1975 discussed the subject with Soviet leaders, and one member of the delegation, Senator Leahy, reported:

As one of those whom the Soviets approached on our recent Senatorial delegation visit to the Soviet Union on the question of Diego Garcia, I know that they did state specifically that they want to enter into negotiations on this question.⁷

A first, tentative step on at least one side of the American Government towards cooperation with the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to seek some kind of agreement with the Soviet Union on arms limitations was taken early in 1974. A concurrent resolution was introduced into the Senate by Senators Edward Kennedy and Claiborne Pell "expressing the sense of Congress that negotiations be sought with the USSR relative to naval and military strength in the Indian Ocean or littoral states." The resolution declared it to be the sense of Congress that

(1) the President of the United States should seek direct negotiations with the USSR, designed to achieve agreement on limiting deployments of their respective naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral states;

(2) these negotiations should be convened as rapidly as possible either in a bilateral forum or within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, augmented to include the United States and the USSR.⁸

Though by no means an endorsement of the Peace Zone proposal, the Kennedy-Pell resolution is one more indication that support exists within the U.S. Government for an Indian Ocean agreement. Though never brought to a vote, the resolution succeeded in attracting the sponsorship of nine senators.

If such a reversal of policy by the United States should lead, in due course, to a conference which, in turn, should produce an agreement along the lines proposed by the peace zone declaration, it is hard to see how such an agreement would work against American interests. The element most disturbing to the United States in the Indian Ocean and usually cited as the principal reason why an American naval presence is needed -- the Soviet naval presence -- would be eliminated or at least limited. It would be difficult for the Soviets to circumvent an agreement -- i.e., undertake a significant military buildup in the region -- without that fact being promptly detected. The detected violation would place the Soviets and any littoral country where the violation occurred in a very disadvantageous position diplomatically

and psychologically, if not militarily. Further, the violation would be easily countered by United States action even if it did not signal an end to the agreement. On the other hand, even if a violation was not detected promptly, it would not place the United States in any grave jeopardy. Finally, an agreement, if constructed along the lines of the peace-zone declaration, would not even preclude the deployment of American forces into the Indian Ocean from time to time, which is really all that current American policy envisages.

If there are sound and persuasive military arguments to support the current position of the United States on Diego Garcia and in opposition to the peace zone proposal, they have not been placed on the public record. The widespread and continuing opposition to the base voiced not only by the countries of the littoral but also by many members of the American Congress is evidence that this is so. Whether there are persuasive arguments based upon information of a highly sensitive nature that the American government is unwilling to discuss publicly cannot, of course, be known from reading the public record. If, for example, the base at Diego Garcia plays, or is intended to play at some future time, a key role in current or planned deployment of American SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, that key role has not been alluded to, even obliquely, in any public testimony by American

officials seeking to justify, first, the establishment and, later, the expansion of the base. Indeed, as mentioned above, at least one official in a position to know has said specifically that the Soviet Union could not counter American SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, because the United States has not deployed them there. Yet the idea that the deployment of American SSBNs is the key to understanding Soviet and American actions in the Indian Ocean continues to be argued by experts on the subject.

The Indian Ocean peace zone proposal specifically includes the concept of a nuclear-free zone by calling for "the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction" from the Indian Ocean.* Hence, any acceptance of the proposal in its present form by the United States would presumably deny to the United States the use of the Indian Ocean as a deployment area for SSBNs, and that fact must, of course, be carefully weighed in any consideration of the proposal. In this connection, a glance at^a world globe would seem to show that, as longer and longer range submarine-launched ballistic missiles are developed and made operational --

* It should be noted also that the peace zone idea does not seek to establish a nuclear-free zone in the territories of the littoral states, only in the Indian Ocean itself and naval bases associated with it. In this respect, the peace zone proposal differs fundamentally from other nuclear-free zone proposals in that it is intended to apply to the high seas rather than to the bordering states. See William Epstein, "Nuclear-free Zones," Scientific American, November, 1975, p. 34.

notably in connection with Trident - larger and larger areas of the ocean will be opened up as possible launching areas, and, consequently, any particular area of the world's oceans, like the Indian Ocean, will become less and less important. It is true, though, that this is the situation as it appears to the layman, uninitiated into the arcane mysteries of how ballistic missiles are launched from beneath the sea against targets thousands of miles away. It is possible, of course, that, to the American missile expert, the situation may not appear that simple, and to him the Indian Ocean may possess certain unique characteristics of overriding importance.

In the aftermath of Watergate and especially in wake of the recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee, it seems obvious that the American Government would be unwise to deal with a controversial question involving national security by saying, in effect: "We are dealing here with a highly classified matter we cannot discuss publicly. You simply must trust us that we are doing the right thing." There have been revelations of too many immoral, illegal and just downright stupid actions by the American Government taken under the protective cloak of secrecy invoked in the interests of national security for this assurance any longer to allay suspicions or end questioning on the part of the American public. The secrecy that has surrounded the base on Diego Garcia since its inception continues to breed suspicion

in the United States and abroad about what the United States is doing in the Indian Ocean, and that suspicion unfortunately tends to make credible to the people in the littoral countries charges repeated by the Soviet Union for years that the purpose of Diego Garcia is to form a springboard for aggressive actions against the littoral countries.⁹ The United States continues to pay a political and psychological price for its current posture with respect to Diego Garcia, and it surely can be said without invoking charges of irresponsibility that a most careful assessment should be made, balancing the military advantages (both highly classified and otherwise) against the costs identified, before a final determination of United States policy is made. It also bears repeating that arguments on the public record for the current position are not persuasive. Consequently, if the policy is not changed, the United States will continue to pay the price it has been paying unless it is prepared, and is able, to make a better case for itself.

If American naval forces in the Indian Ocean and in particular the controversial base at Diego Garcia are to serve American interests in the region, whatever they may be, the United States must recognize that those forces do not operate in a political vacuum. The interests they serve are by definition bound up with the interests of other countries, in particular the countries of the Indian Ocean region. It should

be obvious that events in the Indian Ocean are of greater importance to and more profoundly affect those nations than they affect the United States. In creating the base at Diego Garcia the United States has consistently ignored or discounted the generally adverse reactions of the littoral countries -- the countries most directly affected by the base -- and has thereby turned into a political liability what should be a political asset if it is to serve one of its principal purposes. As a symbol, the base has signalled not American interest in and concern about affairs in the Indian Ocean region as its advocates say it should and does, but rather American unconcern about or ignorance of those affairs and American determination to disregard the views of those in whose interests the United States claims to be acting.

Friends and allies of the United States in the Indian Ocean region now support the United States reluctantly and privately or simply maintain an embarrassed silence. Would it not be better if they forthrightly endorsed what the United States is doing? Through the instrument of one simple initiative, even if that initiative should fail to produce any tangible results and remain only a gesture, the United States could transform its posture with regard to the Indian Ocean from a reactive policy in need of constant apology and justification that persuades no one into a policy of bold initiative. The United States would also thereby convincingly

demonstrate that the ringing words of the Declaration of Independence are not just words, that the United States still has "a decent respect for the opinion of Mankind."

Annex A

Results of surveys conducted by the Department of State
of reactions in littoral countries toward proposals by the
United States to upgrade its facilities on Diego Garcia.

1. Information supplied to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1974).

<u>Country</u>	<u>Official reaction</u>	<u>Press/public reaction</u>
South Africa	Favorable	Favorable
Malawi	Favorable	No reaction
Malagasy	Negative	Negative
Tanzania	Balanced	Balanced
Kenya	No Reaction	Negative
Somalia	No Reaction	Negative
Ethiopia	Favorable	Balanced
Zambia	No Reaction	No Reaction
Sudan	No Reaction	No Reaction
Egypt	No Reaction	No Reaction
Saudi Arabia	No Reaction	No Reaction
Yemen	Favorable	No Reaction
Aden	No Reaction	No Reaction
Oman	No Reaction	No Reaction
Abu Dhabi	Favorable	No Reaction
Kuwait	No Reaction	No Reaction
Iran	No Reaction	Balanced
Pakistan	Favorable	Balanced
Nepal	No Reaction	No Reaction
India	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Bangladesh	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Burma	No Reaction	No Reaction
Ceylon	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Mauritius	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Thailand	Balanced	Unfavorable
Malaysia	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
Singapore	Favorable	Balanced
Indonesia	Balanced	Unfavorable
Australia	Unfavorable	Balanced
New Zealand	Balanced	Balanced

2. Information supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee (1974)

South Africa - Balanced reporting in the press, occasional editorials welcoming the decision of the U.S. to maintain a presence there as long as the Soviet Union has decided to do so. Official reaction "welcomed the U.S. decision with satisfaction."

Malawai - No significant press reports or editorials, official reaction was highly favorable.

Malagasy - Press reporting has been on the whole negative, but has noted that it was the U.S. which moved after the Soviet presence became apparent. Officially, Diego Garcia was described a "purely a US/UK affair," but Malagasy felt it had to protest; it has "tried to be even-handed."

Tanzania - Press reporting has been a bit negative, although mentioning Soviet presence. The GOT seeks an Indian Ocean "free of great power rivalry," but the highest level has told us privately it "understands" the U.S. position and implied sympathetic understanding.

Kenya - Editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from great power arms races. The press has deplored expansion of the Diego Garcia facilities, but there has been no significant official reaction.

Somalia - Press reporting has been critical, but restrained. Government reaction has been official silence.

Ethiopia - No editorials, and very little press reporting, mostly of a factual, non-polemic quality. No official Ethiopian comment, but we have been told by a high official that the IEG shares our concern over Soviet expansion in the area.

Zambia - No reactions, press or official.

Uganda - No reaction, press or official.

Sudan - No reaction, press or official.

Egypt - No reaction, press or official.

Saudi Arabia - No press reaction, comment from Embassy was that there was not likely to be any official reaction.

Yemen - No press reaction; mid-level government reaction was confined to the one word "good."

Aden - No press or official reaction.

Oman - No public or official comment in Oman.

Abu Dhabi - No public or private comment, but our Embassy reports that local attitudes were "relaxed and probably favorable."

Kuwait - No public or private reaction of our Diego Garcia proposals.

Iran - Press reaction has been balanced, but expressed the desire that a great power arms race in the area be avoided. There has been no official Iranian position, but our Embassy believes that GOI would not object unless pressed for a public position; if it were, it might have to express public regrets.

Pakistan - Press reporting has been balanced. The GPO has supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone, but it welcomed our proposed presence.

Nepal - No significant press reporting; a high Nepalese official described Diego Garcia as "not a live issue" to our Ambassador.

India - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Foreign Minister Singh have been critical of the U.S. Diego Garcia proposals, both publicly and privately. They have called for restraint by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. and strongly supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. Press coverage has been more or less uniformly critical.

Bangladesh - Press reaction has been critical, and Mujib has referred to Diego Garcia as "a threat to peace. Those who speak of world peace now build military bases in an area which should be zone of peace." Our Embassy considered his and other official reaction to have been relatively mild and intended for public consumption, and said that the GOBD had taken our Diego Garcia proposals in stride.

Burma - There has been no significant press commentary, and given general Burmese reticence to discuss Indian Ocean matters, the Embassy does not expect any official position to emerge.

Ceylon - Press reporting has been balanced, remarking on the Soviet presence, but has still been largely opposed. The GSL has told our Embassy they did not want to take a

public stand, but have backed the Indian Ocean Peace Zone and feel committed to it. There has been an exchange of correspondence between the two governments in which Sri Lanka called for restraint and an avoidance of an arms race in the Indian Ocean.

Maldives/(sic)- Press and political reaction has been critical. Prime Minister Ramgoolam has spoken out against the Diego Garcia proposals, saying Mauritius did not wish "nuclear warfare introduced into what should be a zone of peace."

Thailand - Press reaction has been critical both of U.S. Diego Garcia proposals and of the Thai involvement in them (use of Thai facilities for staging to Diego); official reaction has been ambivalent, with Diego described as "both good and bad." Thailand subscribes to the Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposals, but has told us that if the Russians are going to be there, the U.S. should too.

Malaysia - Press reaction has been unfavorable, GOM government officials have expressed regret at our proposals and reaffirmed that Malaysia subscribes to the Indian Peace Zone.

Singapore - Press reaction has been balanced, but the Government of Singapore has expressed approval at the highest level.

Indonesia - Press editorials have called for an Indian Ocean free from rivalry among the Great Powers, and supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone. The highest levels of government have told us they regretted our proposals to build a facility at Diego, but that as long as the Soviet Union was in the area, the U.S. should be, too, and Indonesia had no objections.

Australia - Press reaction has been largely critical, with some balanced exceptions. The Labor Government has been outspokenly critical, and offered to support any efforts by the new British Labor Government to halt the project. Only the miniscule Liberal Party has publicly supported Diego Garcia.

New Zealand - Press reaction has been modest and balanced; both Prime Minister Kirk and other officials have told our Embassy they "understand" the U.S. position, and agree that the USSR cannot be left alone in the area, but subscribe to the principles of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone.

3. Information supplied to the Senate Armed Services Committee (1975)

Australia - Unfavorable, but not strident; supports Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) Supports US-USSR talks on mutual restraint.

Bahrain - Nothing specific, but generally supports IOPZ.

Burma - No reaction.

Egypt - Position against military bases in Indian Ocean only mentioned once, in communique after late May visit by Indian Foreign Minister.

Ethiopia - Nothing since new government last September.

India - Very unfavorable; strong support for IOPZ.

Indonesia - Unfavorable, but moderate.

Iran - Favorable, but qualified, i.e. since Sovs are there, U.S. should balance, but Shah wants littorals to assure regional security in longer term.

Kenya - Balanced since does not single out U.S. or USSR for criticism; pro-IOPZ.

Kuwait - Unfavorable, in context of IOPZ.

Malagasy Republic - Unfavorable, pro-IOPZ.

Malaysia - Unfavorable; pro-IOPZ.

Maldives - Unknown; pro-IOPZ.

Mauritius - Unfavorable; strongly pro-IOPZ.

Mozambique - Unknown.

Oman - None

Pakistan - Balanced; opposes foreign bases on its own territory, but says it is in no position to tell major powers what to do in Indian Ocean area.

Qatar - No known public stance.

Saudi Arabia - None known.

Singapore - Balanced; wants no one to dominate area.

Somalia - Sharply unfavorable; pro-IOPZ; usually subsumed under "Imperialist threats."

South Africa - None known

Sri Lanka - Unfavorable but somewhat muted; IOPZ originator

- Sudan - Unknown; assumed unfavorable.

Tanzania - Unfavorable.

Thailand - Unknown; new government has other problems;
would probably be unfavorable.

United Arab Emirates - None known.

Yemen Arab Republic - None known; discreet silence.

Summary (29 countries):

Favorable - None

Balanced - 4 (Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore)

Unfavorable - 12

Unknown - 13

Annex B

2832 (XXVI). Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The General Assembly. -

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity.

Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, calling upon all States to consider and respect The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons,

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources of the States of the area from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions.

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute toward arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace based upon equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time a zone of peace;

2. Calls upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objectives of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other cooperation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by vessels of all nations is unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this declaration.

Vote on Peace Zone Declaration recorded on December 16, 1971.

In Favor: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 60 votes to none, with 55 abstentions (resolution 2832 (XXVI)).

Annex C

Naval Forces of major littoral countries in mid-1975.

AUSTRALIA

Navy: 16,115 active personnel
4 Oberon-class submarines
1 aircraft carrier
3 ASW destroyers with Tartar SAM, Ikara ASW msls.
6 destroyer escorts with Ikara
4 coastal minesweepers
2 minehunters
19 patrol boats
2 fleet support ships
7 landing craft
Fleet Air Arm:
1 fighter-bomber sqn with A-4G Skyhawk
2 ASW sqns with S-2E Tracker and 2 HS-748
2 ASW helicopter sqns with Wessex 31B
1 helicopter sqn with Iroquois and Kiowa
1 trg sqn with Aermacchi MB-326H and 2 TA-4G
(10 Sea King ASW hel for delivery in 1975)
Reserves: 6,294

INDIA

Navy: 30,000 active personnel (including naval air)¹
1 16,000 ton aircraft carrier (ex-British)
6 submarines (ex-Soviet F-class)
2 cruisers
2 destroyers
22 frigates (3 GP with Seacat SAM, 3AA, 7ASW, 9 ex-Soviet Petya-class; 3 more GP building; 1 more Petya-class on order).
8 OSA-class FPB with STYX SSM
9 patrol boats (5 ex-Soviet Poluchat-class).
9 seaward defense boats (6 less than 100 tons)
8 minesweepers (4 inshore)
3 landing ships
3 landing craft (2 ex-Soviet Polocny-class)
Naval Air Force: 1,500 active personnel
33 Sea Hawk attack, 10 Alize MR ac; 6 Sea King (10 Sea Hawk, 5 Alize and 2 Alouette can be carried in the aircraft carrier).

INDONESIA

Navy: 40,000 (including naval air and 5,000 Marines) active personnel

- 5 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class)
- 2 destroyers (ex-Soviet Skory-class)
- 7 frigates (ex-Soviet Riga-class)
- 18 coastal escort (14 ex-Soviet, 4 ex-US)
- 9 Komar-class patrol boats with STYX SSM
- 30 patrol craft
- 5 fleet minesweepers (ex-Soviet T-43 class)
- 20 coastal minesweepers (6 ex-US)
- 17 MGB (ex-Soviet BK-class)
- 35 seaward defense boats (less than 100 tons)
- 4 HQ/support ships
- 10 amphibious warfare vessels
- 2 Marine brigades

Naval Air: 1,000 active personnel

6 c-47; 3 Alouette III and 4 Bell 47G hel (4 Nomad MR ac on order)

PAKISTAN

Navy: 10,000 active personnel

- 3 submarines (French Daphne-class)
- 2 light cruiser/training ship
- 4 destroyers
- 2 frigates (2 more on order)
- 7 coastal minesweepers
- 9 patrol boats (Chinese Shanghai-class)
- 2 UH-19 SAR hel (6 Sea King on order)

Reserves: 5,000

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3. Testimony of James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Interest in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), p. 9.

4. Ibid., p. 13.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 14.

7. Letter written by Stuart Barber. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 174.

8. Anthony Lewis, "Indian Ocean Coral Isle Will Be U.S.-British Base," New York Times, November 11, 1965, p. 8:3.

9. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Selected Material on Diego Garcia, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 2.

10. Ibid.

11. Testimony of Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 165.

12. The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 165.

13. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, P. 167.

14. "Military Construction Appropriations 1976 -- Conference Report." Congressional Record, November 19, 1975, p. S20413-4.

15. New York Times, April 22, 1976, p. 6:1. For the full text of the Department of State's letter, see Congressional Record, May 6, 1976, p. S6626.

16. "We do not believe that the nature of the Soviet naval presence is such as to require any major upgrading of our own activities in the area." The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future, p. 174.

17. Testimony of James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, p. 11.

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1. Michael MccGwire, "The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71," Michael MccGwire, ed. Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 425.

2. Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean," Michael MccGwire, et al, eds. Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 313.

3. Testimony of James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, p. 8.

4. New York Times, April 22, 1976, p. 6:1.
5. Schlesinger, p. 37-8.
6. Jukes, p. 313.
7. Ibid., p. 314.
8. Schlesinger, p. 8.
9. Washington Post, July 20, 1975, p. 1.
10. Manchester Guardian, November 9, 1975, p. 9.
11. Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1975, p. 4.
12. Baltimore Sun, February 26, 1976, p. 4; London Daily Telegraph, April 15, 1976.
13. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 21-2.
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15. Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, p. 17.
16. Ibid., U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975).
17. "Kissinger's Views on Somalia Asked," New York Times, May 6, 1976, p. 8:2. See also Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1976, p. 4.
18. "Diego Garcia," Congressional Record, May 6, 1976, p. S6625-31. See also Spencer Rich, "Ford Administration Role on Diego Garcia Assailed," Washington Post, May 7, 1976, p. 2; Laurence Stern, "Saudi Offer of Aid Reported," Washington Post, May 5, 1976, p. 1.
19. For a discussion of these implications of the Saudi offer, see Henry Bradsher, "War Talk in 'Horn of Africa'", Washington Star, May 6, 1976, p. 5.
20. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (New York: United Nations, 1974), p. 13.

21. Radio Moscow in English to East Africa, 1800 GMT, November 25, 1968.

22. In addition to sources already cited, see also U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Means of Measuring Naval Power With Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974).

23. Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean: Towards A Zone of Peace. New Delhi, p. 9.

Chapter IV

1. Michael McGwire, "Soviet Naval Policy: Prospects for the Seventies," Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context, p. 517.

2. K. Subrahmanyam, "Ebb and Flow of Power in the Indian Ocean Area," p. 11.

3. James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context, p. 390.

4. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 137.

5. These charges have been made numerous times in radio broadcasts beamed to foreign countries. See, for example, Moscow Tass in English to Europe, 2148 GMT, February 10, 1963, as a very early instance. See also, for example, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, in English to Africa, 1430 GMT, November 19, 1970.

6. N.I. Suzdalev, Podvodnye Lodki Protiv Podvodnykh Lodok (Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1968), p. 47.

7. Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry Into the Indian Ocean: An Analysis," Alvin J. Cottrell, and R.M. Burrell, eds., The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, p.

8. Letter from Foreign Minister, USSR, to the President of the United Nations General Assembly dated December 7, 1964.

Chapter V

1. The results were published in Selected Material on Diego Garcia, p. 9-11, and Proposed Expansion of U. S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 45. See Annex A for the complete results as published.

2. "MR. BUCHANAN. Why Diego Garcia? What are the advantages of Diego Garcia?"

"MR. NOYES. The advantages are simply to have in this huge body of water a facility whose use does not require abrasive discussions or potentially abrasive discussions involving the sensitivities of littoral states when a requirement comes to use it. It has no indigenous population." Proposed Expansion of U.S. Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 57.

3. New York Times, November 11, 1965, p. 8:3.

4. V. Zhitomirsky, "The Tragic Story of Diego Garcia," New Times (Moscow), October, 1975.

5. "Military Construction Appropriations 1976 -- Amendment No. 1054," Congressional Record, November 6, 1975, p. S19451-65.

6. "The world ... has changed since the heyday of Nehru, and so has India...Non-alignment in its classical sense was no longer practical in a world where some form of alignment was necessary in order to attain large-scale military, economic and political backing." David Kimche, "From Non-Alignment to Commitment," Asian Affairs, October, 1975, p. 280.

7. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, (Middle East and North Africa) January 19, 1971, p. 01.

8. FBIS Daily Report (Middle East and North Africa) May 12, 1976, p.S-1; William Branigan, "Iran-India Split on Big Powers Seen Hidden," Washington Post, May 17, 1976, p. A14:7.

9. Overseas Hindustan Times, August 14, 1975, p. 6.

10. India News, August 15, 1975, p. 1.

11. Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, p. 2.

12. New York Times, January 18, 1976,

13. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (Middle East and North Africa), July 1, 1975; September 18, 1975.

14. New York Times, March 25, 1969, p. 21:3.

15. FBIS Daily Report (Middle East and North Africa), April 30, 1976, p. R-1.

16. FBIS Daily Report (Middle East and North Africa), May 10, 1976, p. R-1. In an interview in early 1976, Prime Minister Hoveyda, asked to comment on the significance of the new Iranian naval base under construction at Chabahar, barely 60 miles from the Pakistan border, said, "Iran is not a nation of the Persian Gulf alone; we are a nation of the Indian Ocean. And certainly we have interests in the Indian Ocean. The Persian Gulf is a door to the Indian Ocean. And, therefore, as a power of the Indian Ocean we have to have a base." Lewis Simons, "Iran Seen Overspending for Gulf Military Role," Washington Post, February 28, 1976, p. 10. Work on the Chabahar base slowed almost to a halt in late 1975 due to a number of reasons including Iranian financial difficulties and a scandal involving high-ranking Iranian naval officers.

17. FBIS Daily Report (Middle East and North Africa), May 13, 1976, p. S-1.

18. Branigan, Washington Post, May 17, 1976, p. A14:7.

19. Asian Recorder, February 5-11, 1976, p. 13006.

20. Asian Recorder, May 28-June 3, 1975, p. 12607.

Chapter VI

1. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/10029), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, (New York: United Nations, 1975), p. 4.

2. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Twenty-eighth Session, (A/9029), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (New York: United Nations, 1973), p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 8.

4. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (Thirtieth Session, A/10029), p. 6.

Chapter VII

1. "MR. HAMILTON. Is the oil our chief concern there?
MR. WEISS. I would say it is a principal concern, yes, sir." Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 43; "In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area through the Indian Ocean is essential to the economic well-being of much of the world, especially to our allies in Western Europe and Japan. Clearly, it is in our interest that the vital sea lines of communication over which this oil flows remain open to all nations." Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, p. 61.

2. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, p. 36.

3. Reischauer, p. 109.

4. McConnell, p. 391.

5. Dmitry Volsky, "The Indian Ocean Needs Lasting Security," New Times (Moscow), November, 1974 (No. 47), p. 13.

6. Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia (letter of transmittal), p. 1.

7. "Let Us Explore the Possibilities of Negotiations in the Indian Ocean," Congressional Record, July 17, 1975, p. S12857.

8. "Submission of a Concurrent Resolution Relating to Arms Control in the Indian Ocean," Congressional Record, Senate, March 19, 1974, p. 3767.

9. See, for example, Radio Moscow in English to South Asia, 1600 GMT, November 20, 1970; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa, 1430 GMT, November 19, 1970. For a more recent reiteration of the same theme, see FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union), July 11, 1975, p. B6.

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